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Gender Matters: Making the Case for Trans Inclusion 
NANCY J. KNAUER∗  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The transgender communities are producing an important and nuanced 
critique of our gender system.1  For community members, the project is 
self-constitutive and, therefore, has an immediacy that also marks the ef-
forts of other marginalized groups who have attempted to make sense of 
the world through description, interrogation, and ultimately a program for 
transformation.  The transgender project also has universalizing elements 
because, existing within the gender system, each one of us embodies a par-
ticular gender articulation.2  It is through this articulation that we define 
ourselves in relation to the gender we were assigned at birth, the gender we 
choose, the gender we create, the gender we reject, the gender we are, and 
the gender we are assumed to be. 
Lesbian and gay advocacy organizations officially began to incorporate 
transgender issues in the late 1990s, as signaled by the now ubiquitous “T” 
that appears at the end of the popular acronym “LGBT.”3  However, the 
resulting alliance has been an uneasy one and the incorporation has been 
partial.4  The feminist reception to transgender issues has been arguably 
  
 ∗ Peter J. Liacouras Professor of Law, Beasley School of Law, Temple University.  I would like to 
thank Caleb Arnold, Jennifer Dumin, Dana Katz, Robin S. Maril, Rebecca Schatschneider, Luca Stone, 
and Bradeley Terebelo for their insightful comments on earlier drafts. 
 1. In its broadest sense, the term transgender refers “to individuals whose gender identity or ex-
pression does not conform to the social expectations for their assigned sex at birth.”  Introduction to 
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS xiv (Pailsey Currah et al. eds., 2006).  Within the term transgender there are 
numerous and continually evolving identity formations, such as transwoman, transman, FTM, MTF, 
genderqueer, genderfuck, trannyfag, trannydyke, bois.  In short, “[t]ransgender is an expansive and 
complicated social category.”  Id. at xv.   
 2. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has written on the universalizing and minoritizing aspects of homo-
sexuality.  EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 1 (1990).   
 3. The largest lesbian and gay advocacy organization, the Human Right Campaign (HRC), did not 
officially incorporate transgender issues until 2002.  Aaron H. Devor & Nicholas Matte, One Inc. and 
Reed Erickson: The Uneasy Collaboration of Gay and Trans Activism, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES 
READER 389 (Susan Stryker & Stephen White eds., 2006).  The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 
added transgender issues in 1997.  Id.  
 4. For example, HRC resisted repeated calls to lobby for the inclusion of the categories of gender 
identity and expression in the proposed Federal Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA) that 
would bar discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation.  Julie Greenberg, Intersex and 
Intrasex Debates: Building Alliances to Challenge Sex Discrimination, 12 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 99, 
106 (2005). 
File: Knauer - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 1 Created on:  9/2/2007 4:16:00 PM Last Printed: 9/12/2007 10:06:00 AM 
2 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 1   
even less successful and, at times, has been marked by outright hostility.5  
This article, written largely for an audience who does not identify as trans-
gender, makes the case for greater inclusion of transgender issues by iden-
tifying and examining various points of resistance, outlining commonal-
ities, and proposing action steps. 
At the outset, it is critical to acknowledge that what might strike us as a 
relatively esoteric adventure in gender theory represents the lived experi-
ence of transgender individuals.6  Although theory can certainly help to 
illuminate life, and I personally believe that my life has been made richer 
by it, theory is something we produce to serve the living.  All the theory in 
the world will not erase the fact that one of the greatest health risks facing 
transgender individuals is violence.7  This violence is often fueled by tran-
sphobic claims of fraud and deception.8  These charges are echoed by the 
law that also speaks in terms of “gender fraud” and carefully polices the 
binary gender system in an effort to maintain an objective and knowable 
gender truth.9  The burdens of the binary fall disproportionately on the 
most vulnerable segments of society: the poor, the homeless, and the incar-
cerated.  It is imperative to make space within the law and within society 
for individuals to live and express their gender identity as they experience 
it and choose to define it.  Considerations of how transgender identities and 
embodiments challenge and expand our own understanding of gender are 
necessarily tertiary to these pressing issues of safety and legal reform. 
Given the manifest injustice experienced daily by transgender indi-
viduals, it is vexing that many otherwise progressive thinking individuals 
continue to dismiss transgender issues—saying they just don’t “get it.”  
These same progressive thinkers might advocate all manner of non-
traditional pursuits for both men and women and generally applaud in-
stances of gender variance.  However, when faced with a person who seeks 
bodily modification or a change in gender markers or a name change or 
  
 5. See generally JANICE G. RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-
MALE (1994) (providing incendiary indictment of male-to-female transsexuals from a purportedly 
feminist perspective). 
 6. See JACOB HALE, SUGGESTED RULES FOR NON-TRANSSEXUALS WRITING ABOUT 
TRANSSEXUALS, TRANSSEXUALITY, TRANSSEXUALISM OR TRANS ___, http://www.sandystone.com 
/hale.rules.html (last visited June 15, 2007). 
 7. NAT’L COAL. FOR LGBT HEALTH, AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRANS HEALTH PRIORITIES, 
http://www .nctequality.org/HealthPriorities.pdf (last visited June 15, 2007).   
 8. See Kate Bornsetin, Gender Terror, Gender Rage, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, 
supra note 3, at 237 (noting revulsion at trans embodiments often followed “by a physical attack”). 
 9. For example, in 2004 a transwoman in Kansas who had changed her legal gender markers was 
arrested and charged with “false swearing” when she indicated that she was female on an application 
for a marriage license.  David Ranney, Judge Finds Transsexual Did Not Intentionally Mislead Au-
thorities, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD (KAN.), Nov. 17, 2004, available at http://www2.ljworld.com 
/news/2004/nov/17/judge_finds_transsexual.   
File: Knauer - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 1 Created on: 9/2/2007 4:16:00 PM Last Printed: 9/12/2007 10:06:00 AM 
2007 GENDER MATTERS: MAKING THE CASE FOR TRANS INCLUSION 3 
new pronouns, their immediate response is: “Why would anyone want to 
do that?”  Despite their best efforts, these progressive individuals succumb 
to the “ick” factor.10 
The progressive refusal to embrace transgender issues has caused con-
siderable pain in certain transgender communities, and it has squandered 
opportunities for coalition and alliance building.11  I attribute much of the 
progressive resistance to the transgender narrative to a particular form of 
post-feminist agnosticism regarding gender that served as a central tenet of 
identity formation for many of us who were born in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Growing up, we were told that we could be anything we wanted to be and 
gender didn’t matter.  In college, we faithfully repeated the mantra that 
gender was a social construct.12  On some elemental level, we were raised 
to believe that gender is not real and, therefore, it is difficult for us to 
fathom how one could take gender so seriously that it literally redefines the 
person.13  Thus, the first step toward understanding transgender issues is to 
shed this utopian view of gender.  Of course, gender matters.  We have 
been living and advocating an aspirational view of gender.  When we stub-
bornly say that gender does not matter, what we really mean is that gender 
should not matter. 
Once we allow that gender matters, the transgender truth claims re-
garding the press and weight of gender no longer ring of false conscious-
ness.  This opens the space to explore commonalities.  For example, my 
early “tomboy” narrative reads much like the stock transman narrative nec-
essary to secure a diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder and the attendant 
access to medical resources.14  This commonality represents an irrefutable 
degree of kinship.  The fact that my personal narrative stops short of so-
matic dissonance and desire for bodily modification does not prove that I 
  
 10. This is also known as the “yuck factor.”  See Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, June 2, 
1997, available at http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/medical_ethics/me0006.html. 
 11. See RICKI ANNE WILCHINS, READ MY LIPS: SEXUAL SUBVERSION AND THE END OF GENDER 
109–14 (1997) (describing controversy over Michigan Womyn’s [sic] Music Festival trans admission 
policy). 
 12. See generally PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966) (introducing the concept of social 
construction). 
 13. For example, Annalee Newitz asserts that transgender individuals live out a “compensatory 
fantasy” that “generates forms of satisfaction that reality does not provide.”  Annalee Newitz, Gender 
Slumming, BAD SUBJECTS, Sept. 1993, http://bad.eserver.org/issues/1993/07/newitz.html. 
 14. The DSM-IV classifies GID as a mental disorder.  GID is the diagnosis given to transgender and 
other gender-variant individuals.  GID replaced the prior term of “gender dysphoria.”  Because GID is 
classified as a mental disorder, some transgender individuals consider it offensive.  However, the 
diagnosis is often necessary to secure medical intervention to further bodily modification.  Dean Spade, 
Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 18 (2003) (discussing the 
“oppressive relationship between medicine and gender transgressive people”).  In addition, there has 
been considerable criticism of the use of a GID diagnosis to label gender non-conforming children.  
JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 97 (2004).  
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am well adjusted and the transman is delusional.  The fact that I have not 
experienced that desire does not invalidate it. 
From a position of commonality within our difference, it is then possi-
ble to consider how transgender identities and embodiments challenge and 
enhance our understanding of existing identity formations.  What possibili-
ties exist within the categories of man/woman once the gender assigned at 
birth is no longer an inexorable command?  Are the terms heterosex-
ual/homosexual now hopeless incoherencies?  These questions (and others) 
have produced considerable anxiety in certain identity-based communities, 
particularly lesbian communities.15  Regardless of any personal feelings of 
loss or dislocation, I believe that we have a responsibility to engage these 
challenges rather than dismiss them. 
Many of us probably share a healthy skepticism of stable identities and 
various forms of essentialism.  Although we may know that identities are 
historically contingent, the limits of that knowledge might be tested when 
the identity in question happens to be the one we are currently using.  For 
example, we may have no difficulty discussing the myth of the transhis-
torical homosexual subject,16 but may bristle at the assertion that someone 
who was a lesbian and who now identifies as male (and perhaps always 
did) can still maintain the identification of “dyke” while pursuing relation-
ships with other male-identified individuals (who may or may not have 
been assigned that gender at birth).17  If you had to read that last sentence 
several times, then I invite you to spend some time on a social networking 
site with active trans communities, such as LiveJournal.18  The twenty-
something generation is presently engaged in a redefinition of gender and 
sexuality that is guaranteed to make your queer head spin. 
The fact that the transgender movement has particular resonance to the 
twenty-something generation (i.e., Generation Y) underscores the historical 
contingency of identity and places an even greater responsibility on the 
resistant Baby Boomers and Gen Xers to get with the program of trans 
  
 15. Gayle Rubin notes “many lesbian[s] are antagonistic toward transsexuals, treating male-to-
female transsexuals as menacing intruders and female-to-male transsexuals as treasonous deserters.”  
Gayle Rubin, Of Catamites and Kings: Reflections on Butch, Gender, and Boundaries, in THE 
PERISTENT DESIRE: A FEMME-BUTCH READER 474 (Joan Nestle ed., 1992); see also Zachary I. Nataf, 
Lesbians Talk Transgender, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 439. 
 16. See EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS OF 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 93–116 (1999) (discussing essentialist/constructionist debate). 
 17. See Jason Cromwell, Queering the Binaries: Transsituated Identities, Bodies, and Sexualities, in 
THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 515–17 (discussing “subversive sexual de-
sires”); see also Rubin, supra note 15, at 475–76 (arguing lesbian community should not ostracize 
FTMs).  
 18. LiveJournal Home Page, http://www.livejournal.com (last visited Aug. 17, 2007).  A recent 
search on LiveJournal.com for communities interested in the key word “transgender” produced 402 
results.   
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inclusion.19  This is especially true given the fact that we are the folks cur-
rently assuming positions of power within the academy, the bench, and the 
bar.  Certainly, the notion of a generation gap is a familiar one.  It is a 
common tension running through families, as often reflected for our 
amusement, in novels, movies, and television sit-coms.20  However, the 
ramifications of a generation gap are very different when it occurs in iden-
tity-based communities as opposed to traditional families.21  Within your 
family of origin, generational miscommunication and conflict mark a rite 
of passage.  Absent a particularly egregious lapse, the youth does not get 
thrown out of the house nor does the youth dispossess the parents.  Within 
an identity-based community, a generational redefinition can mark a com-
plete schism.  Resources are wasted, alliances are lost, and inevitably some 
of the participants are pilloried for their positions.  When we remember 
that an identity-based community often represents an individual’s chosen 
family, the threat of expulsion or rejection is especially harsh and can have 
devastating consequences on both the individual and the group.22 
We have the tools to prevent the schism.  The first step is to admit that 
gender matters, although we can certainly remain convinced that it should 
not matter.  Second, we should explore commonalities without invalidating 
difference.  We all experience gender and participate in the gender system.  
Third, we have to face our anxiety and re-examine our own identity forma-
tions in light of emerging transgender identities and embodiments.  We 
owe it to ourselves and to the new generation of creative and fearless indi-
viduals who are trying to make sense of the gender binary while fashioning 
new ways to live and love.  They deserve our support.  Besides, the family 
resemblance is undeniable. 
  
 19. See generally WILLIAM STRAUSS & NEIL HOWE, THE FOURTH TURNING (1997) (classifying 
Anglo-American generational archetypes).  According to Strauss and Howe, Baby Boomers were born 
from 1943 until 1960.  Gen Xers, also referred to as the Thirteenth Generation, were born from 1961 to 
1981.  Generation Y, also referred to as the Millennial Generation, consists of individuals born from 
1982 to 2003. 
 20. The term generation gap was popularized in the late 1960s to reflect the tension between the 
youth culture of the Baby Boomers and their parents’ generation who had fought in World War II. 
 21. Gay and lesbian communities are examples of identity-based communities.  Given that homo-
phobia may complicate relations with an individual’s family of origin, these identity-based communi-
ties may serve as the base for an individual’s “chosen family.”  See KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE 
CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP (1997).   
 22. Rubin notes, “[a] woman who has been respected, admired, and loved as a butch may suddenly 
be despised, rejected, and hounded when she starts a sex change.”  Rubin, supra note 15, at 475. 
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II.  THE NECESSARY LIE: GENDER DOESN’T MATTER 
The progressive resistance to transgender narratives is rooted in a post-
feminist agnosticism regarding the nature of gender as a social construct.23  
In many instances, this understanding of gender has served us well.  How-
ever, our preoccupation with the temporal nature of gender and gender 
expression has discounted its present social meaning and ignored the basic 
fact that, as a social construct, gender matters.  It has also led us to misin-
terpret historical transgender identities and embodiments as wholly instru-
mental deployments of gender, exemplified by the label “passing 
women.”24  Accordingly, the chimera that gender doesn’t matter has out-
lived its usefulness, and it is time to leave the comfort of its lie. 
When our parents and teachers and mentors and classmates told us that 
gender did not matter, what they really meant was that gender should not 
matter.  In other words, there are no biological or other objective consid-
erations that would bar women from excelling in certain professions or 
prevent men from being nurturing stay-at-home parents.  However, the fact 
that gender could not thus constrain us as it had prior generations did not 
mean that gender would not continue to define us.  The transgender narra-
tives report first-hand the contemporary significance of gender in the social 
and political struggle for legibility.25 
  
 23. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF GENDER 7–9 
(1990) (discussing cultural construction of gender). 
 24. JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIAN AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. (rev. 
ed. 1992). 
 25. Some of the first transgender narratives were compiled by medical researchers who worked to 
define and diagnose transsexualism.  For example, Harry Benjamin’s 1966 book THE TRANSSEXUAL 
PHENOMENON detailed his experience with hundreds of transgender patients.  Dallas Denny, Changing 
Models of Transsexualism, in TRANSGENDER SUBJECTIVITIES: A CLINICIAN’S GUIDE 26 (Ubaldo Leli 
& Jack Descher eds., 2004).  As discussed infra, these early iterations of the transgender experience 
became the standard for diagnosis and transgender individuals who desired medical intervention mod-
eled their personal narratives to comply with Benjamin’s early case studies.  See infra text accompany-
ing notes 89–91.  In addition to these clinical collections, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, transgender 
individuals produced autobiographies detailing their individual journeys, largely in terms that con-
formed to the accepted medical model.  See PAT CALIFIA, SEX CHANGES: THE POLITICS OF 
TRANSGENDERISM 11–48 (1997) (discussing “first wave” of transsexual autobiography written by of 
Christine Jorgensen, Jan Morris, and Mario Martino).  The 1980s saw a new wave of transgender 
autobiography that departed the prevailing medical model and laid the groundwork for transgender 
activism.  Id. at 163–92 (discussing autobiographical work by Renee Richards, Leslie Feinberg, and 
Kate Bornsetin).  In recent years there has been an explosion of transgender autobiographical works, 
including full-length book projects, anthologies, and first-person articles.  JENNIFER FINNEY BOYLAN, 
SHE’S NOT THERE: A LIFE IN TWO GENDERS (2004) (autobiography); CROSSING SEXUAL BOUNDARIES: 
TRANSGENDER JOURNEYS, UNCHARTED PATHS (J. Ari Kane-DeMaio & Vern L. Bullough eds., 2006) 
(anthology); HOLLY DEVOR, FTM: FEMALE-TO MALE TRANSSEXUALS IN SOCIETY (1999) (sociological 
study); GENDERQUEER: VOICES FROM BEYOND THE BINARY (Joan Nestle et al. eds., 2002) (anthology); 
JAMISON GREEN, BECOMING A VISIBLE MAN (2004) (autobiography); VIVIANE K. NAMASTE, INVISIBLE 
LIVES: THE ERASURE OF TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE (2002) (sociology);  THE 
PHALLUS PALACE: FEMALE TO MALE TRANSSEXUALS (Dean Koluta ed., 2002); SEXUAL 
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This section explores the nature of the progressive resistance to trans-
gender narratives.  It first parses the progressive characterization of any 
form of gender reassignment as a reactionary measure that re-inscribes the 
gender binary.  It then demonstrates the difficulty of incorporating trans-
gender narratives in a world view where gender is merely a social con-
struct.  It concludes with a discussion of how feminist and gay and lesbian 
histories have erased or demonized transgender identities and how the con-
tinued currency of these histories serves to invalidate the contemporary 
transgender experience. 
A. Transgender Identities as Reactionary 
The first stumbling block to accepting, or at least not dismissing, 
transgender narratives is a lack of empathy.  Perhaps this is because many 
non-trans-identified progressive individuals do not have a particularly 
strong sense of being gendered.  Or perhaps it is because our sense of gen-
der is in harmony with our assigned and perceived gender, and therefore, 
gender does not represent a friction point in our lives.  An analogous ex-
ample could be the white person who does not have an active awareness 
that s/he is raced.26 
In the course of many conversations, I have heard otherwise progres-
sive and open-minded people report that when it comes to transgender is-
sues, they just “don’t get it.”  Until recently, I could be counted as among 
those otherwise progressive folks for whom transgender issues seemed at 
best foreign and at worst reactionary.  During these, at times, heated con-
versations, a commonly heard refrain is: “Why would anyone want to do 
that?”  The word that can be used as a stand in for any number of steps that 
indicate a repudiation of the gender assigned at birth: a name change, dif-
ferent pronouns, a change in legal gender markers, hormone treatment, 
surgical modification, or sex reassignment (aka confirmation) surgery.27  
  
METAMORPHOSIS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF TRANSSEXUAL MEMOIRS (Jonathan Ames ed., 2005); 
WILCHINS, supra note 11 (autobiography).  In addition, the Internet and the opportunity for online 
social networking has greatly enhanced the availability of transgender autobiographical writing.  See 
Stephen Whittle, Forward to THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at xii (noting that 
“Internet development was crucial to the development of a new, geographically dispersed, diverse trans 
community in the 1990s”).   
 26. RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
WHITENESS 142 (1993) (describing color-blind thinking as the “polite language of race”).  Attempts by 
white people to muster empathy often fail because the analogies white people draw regarding race 
result in trivialization or create “false empathy.”  See RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? 
4–36 (1996) (discussing dearth of empathy and abundance of “false empathy”).  
 27. For example, Dean Koluta notes, “I object to the term transgender when applied to transsexuals, 
since we are not changing our gender . . . but are instead changing our body’s sex.”  Dean Koluta, 
Introduction to THE PHALLUS PALACE, supra note 25, at xx. 
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Many of the same people who dismiss the relevancy, or even legitimacy, of 
transgender issues might be proud of their own episodes of gender variance 
and go to great lengths to make sure that their children have a range of 
non-traditional toys, books, and role models.  Under this worldview, gen-
der variance is desirable, but only provided the individual remains moored 
to the gender assigned at birth.  Indeed, the transgressive qualities of gen-
der variance are only legible if the individual starts with an identifiable and 
knowable gender.  There can be no meaningful variance without an origi-
nal position. 
Moreover, efforts to jump gender and assert gender self-definition 
through some form of reassignment—whether social, legal, and/or physi-
cal—are branded as the antithesis of the otherwise admired gender vari-
ance.  According to this reasoning, taking steps to secure gender recogni-
tion is regressive because such actions reinforce the binary gender system 
which, we all know, is an oppressive social construct at the root of much 
inequality and human suffering.  This last rhetorical flourish allows the 
progressive thinker to retain the title of “progressive” while the transgender 
individual is dismissed as reactionary.28  The progressive thinker is more 
evolved because s/he sees past the restrictive gender system.  The reason-
ing is self-flattering and nicely maintains the status quo.  It goes something 
like this: 
After all, gender is just a social construct.  For goodness sake, we 
have known that since Margaret Mead got back from Samoa.  How 
sad that some people get trapped by gender and can’t see any other 
way out.  I’ve never let my gender stop me from doing anything.  
Are there still people out there who think you have to change sex 
in order to act in a certain way?  Is it really worth self-mutilation?  
I guess if it causes them such horrendous psychic harm, then medi-
cal intervention might be warranted—like the amputee people.  
What a shame.  I don’t think medicine should encourage this.29 
Obviously, this mode of thinking dismisses the transgender demand for 
gender recognition consistent with gender identity.  It ignores the fact that 
transgender individuals report an intense desire for such recognition and 
denies their claim for the right to gender self-definition.  It also fails to 
  
 28. Newitz asserts that “[t]ransgender could . . . be understood as a form of nostalgia for traditional 
gender.”  Newitz, supra note 13. 
 29. Joanne Meyerowitz notes: “From the 1920s on, Margaret Mead and others had argued that sex 
roles which varied across cultures, resulted from social learning.”  JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX 
CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 114 (2002).  Susan Stryker relates 
a similar line of reasoning.  Susan Stryker, (De)Subjugated Knowledges: An Introduction to Trans-
gender Studies, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 1 (describing “a line of think-
ing . . . that passed at the time for a progressive point of view among many on the cultural left”). 
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acknowledge the simple fact that innumerable transgender individuals re-
port that the harmonization of gender recognition and gender identity can 
greatly enhance their individual sense of self-fulfillment and happiness. 
B. Gender Doesn’t/Shouldn’t Matter 
Unfortunately, this gender agnosticism or outright disbelief in gender 
might be difficult to shake, given that it has provided many of us with a 
much needed coping mechanism as we set about the process of self-
definition.  As a child of the second wave of feminism, I am the classic 
post-feminist gender agnostic, and I can’t say that I have ever particularly 
felt the press or pull of gender.  I suspect that there are a good number of 
you out there who, like me, go about your daily business secure in the be-
lief that anatomy is not destiny and that gender is a social construct.30  We 
teach this to our children and try to model it for our students.  Indeed, for 
the women of my generation, many of the steps we took and the life 
choices we made were only possible because we believed that the tradi-
tional concept of woman could not constrain us.  We are the proof that 
Freud was wrong and Larry Summers be damned.31 
For women who grew up in the late 1960s and 1970s, gender and gen-
dered expectations could at times be a bit of a drag.32  Our refusal to be-
lieve in gender, or be limited by it, did not mean that we escaped the gen-
der system or necessarily rejected gender entirely.  In the space between 
disbelief and rejection, we theorized our participation in terms of individ-
ual agency.  As a result, many of us wear our gender lightly—feeling free 
to pick and choose from a broad range of gender expression.  Some of us 
wear our assigned gender aggressively, but when we do so, we say that we 
affirmatively choose it.  As one of my colleagues is fond of saying, “femi-
nism gives me the ability to choose to wear pink spike-heeled shoes.”  She 
then mentions the Emma Goldman (mis)quote about the need to have 
dancing at the revolution.33  Personally, I have never quite graduated from 
  
 30. Both Simone de Beauvoir and Betty Friedan took issue with Freud’s assertion that “anatomy is 
destiny.”  SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 42 (1949); BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE 
MYSTIQUE 18 (1963).  For a discussion of the meaning of the phrase, see Tori Moi, Is Biology Destiny? 
Freud and Biological Determinism, in WHOSE FREUD? THE PLACE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN 
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 72 (Peter Brooks & Alex Woloch eds., 2000). 
 31. See Sam Dillon & Sara Rimer, No Break in Storm over Harvard President’s Words, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at A14 (discussing statements made by Summers concerning women and sci-
ence). 
 32. Patti Smith once remarked, “[a]s far as I’m concerned being any gender is a drag.”  Cliff Jahr, 
Patti, NEW TIMES MAG., Dec. 26, 1975, http://www.oceanstar.com/patti/intervus/751226nt.htm. 
 33. The (mis)quote frequently attributed to Emma Goldman and printed on t-shirts is: “If I can’t 
dance, I don’t want to be in your revolution.”  Alix Kates Shulman, who wrote an early biography of 
Goldman, has explained that the quote is a distilled version of an incident reported by Goldman in her 
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the angry sartorial splendor of Queer Nation kids, although I am increas-
ingly thankful to Ellen DeGeneres for providing a role model who wears 
V-neck sweaters and flat shoes.34  Ms. Goldman would also approve of her 
dancing.35 
For those of us committed to maximizing such personal agency, Judith 
Butler’s notion of gender as the performative made intuitive sense of our 
daily, and often uneasy, negotiations within the gender system.36  What 
some derided as elliptical jargon,37 reads to many of us as an astute and 
insightful treatment of our lived experience—that sometimes truly ellipti-
cal race to distance ourselves from the category of “woman” as it existed 
when Betty Friedan published The Feminine Mystique.38  Of course, to us, 
it was imperative that we believe that there was nothing real or true about 
that category.39  In this way, we understood—through our lived experi-
ence—that all gender was a copy for which there was no original.40 
Transgender narratives represent a much more fundamental engage-
ment of the gender system.  Our source of friction with the gender system 
was largely centered on the restrictive socially constructed categories of 
man and woman (circa 1963).41  While remaining gendered, we rejected 
the prescribed content of these categories and increased the range of avail-
able role options and acceptable expression for each gender.  This changed 
and expanded the gender system, but it did not dismantle it.  Legal reforms 
  
autobiography.  Alix Kates Shulman, Dances with Feminists, WOMEN’S REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 1991, 
http://sunsite3.berkeley.edu/Goldman/Features/dances_shulman.html. 
 34. Alessandra Stanley, Bringing a Touch of Daytime to Hollywood’s Biggest Night, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2007, at E1. 
 35. Jacques Steinberg, Miss Congeniality Wants the Oscars to be Fun, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at 
E1 (explaining DeGeneres’ habit of dancing through the audience). 
 36. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 23, at 140.  Butler writes:  
Gender ought not to be constructed as a stable identity or locus of agency from which vari-
ous acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an 
exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts.  The effect of gender is produced through 
the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which 
bodily gestures, movements, and styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding 
gendered self.  This formulation moves the conception of gender off the ground of a sub-
stantial model of identity to one that requires a conception of gender as a constituted social 
temporality . . . a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, includ-
ing the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief.   
Id. at 140–41.  
 37. Martha Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1999, at 45. 
 38. FRIEDAN, supra note 30.  
 39. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 23, at 141.  Butler writes: “Genders can be neither true 
nor false, neither real nor apparent, neither original nor derived.  As credible bearers of those attributes, 
however, gender can also be rendered thoroughly and radically incredible.”  Id.  
 40. Id. at 138.  Discussing drag performances, Butler writes: “The notion of gender parody defended 
here does not assume that there is an original which such parodic identities imitate.  Indeed, the parody 
is of the very notion of an original.”  Id. 
 41. Betty Friedan published THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE in 1963.  Margalit Fox, Betty Friedan, Who 
Ignited a Movement with ‘The Feminine Mystique’ Dies at 85, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at A20.   
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declared considerations of gender irrelevant in employment, housing, edu-
cation, and the like.42  Increasingly, the gender of one’s romantic partner is 
no longer of consequence.43  These efforts at legal reform set about to out-
law the opinions and prejudices that perpetuated the categories we had 
already rejected as unreal and unreasonable.  However, the reforms left in 
place a binary gender system that the law continues to police with consid-
erable zeal.  As discussed below in Part IV.C., I believe many non-
transgender individuals would be shocked at the extent to which gender 
remains an important part of our public life.  Gender may be legally irrele-
vant for most purposes, but in order to be a recognizable legal subject, you 
must first have a legible and legally sanctioned gender.  In this way, the 
legal reforms instituted in the wake of the second wave of feminism never 
addressed the fundamental concept of being gendered because it was not 
something that we ever questioned. 
It would be a shame to stop our interrogation of the gender system 
simply because we have managed to carve out sufficient breathing space 
for ourselves.  Although gender may be a social construct, its danger, and 
the reason we rail against its limitations, is precisely because we render 
ourselves socially, politically, and legally legible through gender.  If we are 
not going to dismantle the gender system, then it is imperative to create 
sufficient breathing space within the system for everyone—regardless of 
how they experience gender.  Continued resistance to transgender narra-
tives and their demand for gender self-definition robs us of potential allies 
and abnegates our responsibility to the next generation to continue to act as 
agents for progressive social change. 
C. Come to Find Out—Our Histories Often Reflect the Present 
The same gender agnosticism that helped us navigate difficult life 
choices also influenced the way we interpreted history and fashioned our 
role models.  As the second wave of feminism exploded the myth that 
anatomy was destiny, it looked to history for examples of remarkable 
women who defied gender barriers.44  The first wave of the related lesbian 
and gay civil rights movement also mined history to find inspirational ex-
amples of same-sex relationships and individuals who risked everything 
  
 42. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment 
“because of . . . sex.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).  The Federal Fair Housing Act forbids discrimina-
tion in housing based on sex.  42 U.S.C. § 360 (2006).  Title IX prohibits discrimination in education 
“on the basis of sex.”  20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).  
 43. For example, it is no longer constitutionally permissible to criminalize consensual adult homo-
sexual conduct.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).   
 44. See Shulman, supra note 33 (explaining how Emma Goldman became a “hero of women’s 
liberation”). 
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for their right to love.45  These histories greatly influenced identity forma-
tion for those of us coming of age in the 1970s and 1980s and helped forge 
our conviction that issues of sexuality and desire are distinct from gender.46  
Upon review of some of the basic texts, it is startling to see that many of 
these histories were premised on a complete negation of transgender possi-
bilities.47  Thus, overcoming the progressive resistance to the transgender 
narrative also involves unlearning some of our basic history lessons—
lessons that in retrospect we can see were crafted as much to counter the 
prevailing views of womanhood as they were to educate. 
These histories have long since passed into the revisionist canon and 
have been retold to new generations as morality tales where the individual 
triumphs over the life-denying constraints of gender.  The heroes who 
emerge tell a consistent story of gender, as exemplified by the stock char-
acter of the “passing women.”48  Prior to the second wave, as the story 
goes, gender roles were so rigid and impermeable that some women had no 
choice but to pass as men in order to pursue their dreams.  Sometimes 
these dreams involved practicing medicine.  Other times, the goal was 
simply to live openly with a female partner.  In either event, these “passing 
women,” as they were called, chose to masquerade as men to secure male 
privilege and material advantage.49  Under this retelling, their repudiation 
of the gender they were assigned at birth was a wholly instrumental deci-
sion as opposed to a fundamental need.  Their actions were necessitated by 
the widely-held false belief that the gender assigned at birth determined an 
individual’s abilities.  The “passing women,” we learned, were motivated 
by career goals and/or sexuality—not an overwhelming organic knowledge 
that they did not belong to the gender they were assigned at birth. 
It is easy to see how this understanding of “passing women” directly 
informs the progressive resistance to contemporary transgender narratives.  
First and foremost, “passing women” are always women, referred to by 
their female name and female pronouns.50  Their chosen lives are presented 
as an elaborate illusion or ruse; the result of a well-executed and com-
pletely self-aware performance or masquerade.  They do not represent a 
  
 45. See generally LEILA J. RUPP, A DESIRED PAST: A SHORT HISTORY OF SAME-SEX LOVE IN 
AMERICA (1999). 
 46. For a discussion of the connection that gay men and lesbians feel for history, see SCOTT 
BRAVMANN, QUEER FICTIONS OF THE PAST: HISTORY, CULTURE, AND DIFFERENCE 4 (1997) (asserting 
that queer fictions of the past [are] important social/cultural texts in the articulation of lesbian and gay 
identities and differences). 
 47. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 24, at 209–10. 
 48. Jonathan Katz coined the term “passing women” in his seminal 1976 book on lesbian and gay 
history.  Id. at 209. 
 49. Id. at 209–10. 
 50. Id. 
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historical variation of trans identifications but instead are driven, career-
oriented, and sexually-variant women who were willing to go to great 
lengths to achieve their goals. 
If one accepts “passing women” as sexually variant career-minded gals 
who were ahead of their time, then contemporary conditions with respect 
to gender role options and the recognition of same-sex relationships argua-
bly eliminate the need to jump gender.  If gender is no longer a barrier to 
entry to the professions and same-sex couples can live openly in relative 
safety, then there remains no cognizable reason for individuals to repudiate 
their gender assigned at birth.  Under this reasoning, individuals who still 
express a desire to do so are clinging to outmoded notions of gender.  They 
are sadly misguided, hopelessly reactionary, and perhaps guided by the 
corrosive compulsions of internalized homophobia. 
This portrayal of “passing women” spoke directly to the goals of the 
second wave of feminism and the related gay rights movement.  As noted 
in the above section, the two main gender friction points experienced by 
non-trans identified individuals are gender role limitations and the con-
demnation of same-sex relationships.  Just as it is not surprising that the 
most successful social and legal reforms have concentrated on these areas, 
it is understandable that the new histories constructed narratives that re-
volved around these flashpoints.  By privileging career aspirations and 
sexuality, the histories established an immediate commonality between the 
travails of the “passing women” and modern day women.  In addition, the 
fact that the “passing women” were skilled illusionists reflected a non-
essential view of gender as something that can be consciously deployed 
and adopted instrumentally as may be required by the situation. 
The seminal characterization of “passing women” as proto-lesbian-
feminists was Jonathan Katz’s 1976 highly influential Gay American His-
tory.51  Describing the phenomenon of “passing women,” Katz explained 
that “[d]espite their masculine masquerade, the females considered here 
can be understood not as imitation men, but as real women, women who 
refused to accept the traditional, socially assigned fate of their sex, women 
whose particular revolt took the form of passing as men.”52  In order to 
reclaim the “passing women” as “women-loving women,” Katz indulged in 
some striking feats of psychoanalysis that, albeit popular at the time, were 
exactly the type of phantasmagorical machinations that secured a listing for 
  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 209.  Katz defended his characterization as follows: “In a most radical way, the women 
whose lives are recounted here rejected their socially assigned passive role; they affirmed themselves 
as self-determined, active, assertive, powerful—in the way they knew, the guise of men.  These passing 
women can only be understood within the framework of a feminist analysis.”  Id. at 211.  
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homosexuality in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual until 1973.53  For ex-
ample, Katz theorizes that when Dr. Alan Hart (née Alberta Lucille Hart) 
requested a hysterectomy in 1918,54 his decision “was socially coerced”55 
and he was “clearly express[ing] her need to neutralize guilt about Lesbi-
anism.”56  Influenced by French post-structuralism, Katz explains that 
“passing women” did not actually desire bodily modification.57  Rebuffing 
even the slightest whiff of penis envy, Katz writes: “[T]he ‘passing 
woman’ does not identify herself as of the male gender.  She does not wish 
to possess a male body; she wants to play ‘the role of a male,’ not be male.  
It is not the male’s penis she covets, but the male’s socially given 
power.”58 
In recent years, trans activists have challenged this view of historical 
figures, including Dr. Hart.  In 1982, a lesbian and gay advocacy group in 
Oregon inaugurated a service award in the name of Lucille Hart that was 
presented at a dinner bearing the same name.59  Consistent with Katz’s 
treatment of Hart as a female-identified lesbian, information the organiza-
tion prepared about Hart used his birth name, referred to him with female 
pronouns, and described him as “Oregon’s most famous lesbian.”60  This 
prompted protests from trans activists who urged the organization to set the 
record straight—Dr. Alan Hart was a transman.61  Under pressure, the gay 
organization finally relented in 1996 and stopped using Hart’s name en-
tirely.62 
Other examples of this (mis)understanding of trans identities include 
the way the media reported the 1996 murder of Brandon Teena63 and the 
1989 revelation that the deceased jazzman Billy Tipton was born female.64  
In the case of Brandon Teena, much of the press coverage used female 
  
 53. For a discussion of the fight to declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder, see RONALD 
BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS (1987).  Al-
though homosexuality was deleted in 1973, ego-dystonic homosexuality remained until 1987.  Id. at 
176. 
 54. For a trans-centric view of Dr. Hart’s life, see Ken Morris and Kay Brown, The Alan Lucille 
Hart Story, available at http://www.transhistory.net/history/TH_Alan_Hart.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
2007).  See also Margaret Deirdre O’Hartigan, Alan Hart, in THE PHALLUS PALACE, supra note 25, at 
157–66. 
 55. KATZ, supra note 24, at 279. 
 56. Id. at 278. 
 57. Id. at 277. 
 58. Id. 
 59. O’Hartigan, supra note 54, at 158.   
 60. Id. at 160. 
 61. Id. at 161. 
 62. Tom Bates, Decades Ago: An Oregon Doctor Tried to Redefine Gender, SUNDAY OREGONIAN, 
July 14, 1996, at B1. 
 63. CALIFIA, supra note 25, at 230. 
 64. See generally DIANE WOOD MIDDLEBROOK, SUITS ME: THE DOUBLE LIFE OF BILLY TIPTON 
(1999). 
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pronouns, described him as a lesbian, and explained that his choice to pass 
as a boy in rural Nebraska was necessitated by homophobia.65  Billy Tipton 
on the other hand was reported as a historical example of what women had 
to do in order to get a break in certain professions.  As his biographer ex-
plained in 1998, “Billy was not unique in solving an economic problem or 
seizing a tempting opportunity just by donning trousers.”66 
In addition to retelling these heroic tales of instrumental gender vari-
ance, the emerging fields of women’s history and gay and lesbian history 
also addressed the question of gender roles within the gay and lesbian 
communities.  Unlike the individual tales of gender variance, the adoption 
of group-wide gender standards was not valorized. 
Instead, it was the brave souls who resisted community gender norms 
who were lauded for their vision and fortitude.  This reflected the con-
certed effort to distance the contemporary gay rights movement from im-
ages of gender inversion and what was referred to as “role playing.”67  The 
continued association of homosexuality with cross-gender performance 
was denounced as the result of either false consciousness exhibited by 
some community members who reflexively aped hetero-patriarchy or an 
unfortunate and persistent stereotype that originated with the early sexolo-
gists.68  Drag queens were asked not to participate in early Gay Pride Pa-
rades, and the vibrant butch/femme communities of the 1950s were con-
demned as nothing more than a stifling facsimile of post-war gender roles 
and expectations.69  The hostility directed at gender-atypical deployments 
of homosexuality undoubtedly helps to explain the sometimes uneasy and 
tumultuous incorporation of the “T” portion of LGBT.70 
Two very influential nonfiction books, published ten years apart, pro-
vide an excellent example of how feminist and gay and lesbian histories 
treated community-wide atypical gender norms.  Both books told the story 
of equality-minded young lesbians who felt alienated and excluded from 
the 1950s bar culture due to their unwillingness to assume a butch or 
  
 65. CALIFIA, supra note 25, at 230. 
 66. MIDDLEBROOK, supra note 64, at 6.  The term “transsexual” warrants one reference in the index 
and a cross reference to cross dressing performative. 
 67. CALIFIA, supra note 25, at 230. 
 68. Foucault asserted that homosexuality was “characterized . . . less by a type of sexual relations 
than by a certain quality of sexual sensibility, a certain way of inverting the masculine and the feminine 
in oneself.”  1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 43 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978); see 
also SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 45–47 (discussing Foucault’s views on inversion). 
 69. See Devor & Matte, supra note 3, at 388 (noting that “[b]ull daggers, drag queens, transgendered 
and transsexual people, were largely treated as embarrassments in the “legitimate” fight for tolerance, 
acceptance, and equal rights”). 
 70. Kenji Yoshino notes that gender atypical behavior remains “a marker for homosexuality” and 
discusses the “force of the straight-acting homosexual—the butch gay man or the lipstick lesbian.”  
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L. J. 769, 844 (2002). 
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femme gender role in order to be legible within that community.  The 1972 
book Lesbian/Woman71 was one of the first lesbian-affirming books put out 
by a mainstream publisher for a general audience.  Authored by Del Martin 
and Phyllis Lyon, founders of the pre-Stonewall homophile group the 
Daughters of Bilitis, the book was widely popular and reissued in a twenti-
eth anniversary edition.72  Written when homosexuality was still classified 
as a mental disorder, the book directly refuted the psychoanalytic under-
standing of the female homosexual as a “pseudo male”73 with a feminist 
interpretation of women-identified-women. 
Lesbian/Woman had nothing good to say about the butch/femme cul-
ture, except that it was on the wane.  Clear that “[l]esbians are women who 
are attracted to women,”74 the authors explained that lesbians often fell into 
butch/femme behavior due to cultural “brainwashing,”75 noting that many 
“[l]esbians are caught up in the myths and stereotypes so prevalent in our 
society.”76  According to Martin and Lyon, all lesbians who engaged in 
“role-playing” suffered from false consciousness.77  In this way, the au-
thors were not merely attempting to establish women-loving-women as 
distinct from butch/femme identifications; they were attempting to dis-
credit butch/femme identities in their totality.  For example, the authors 
include the first person narrative of a stone butch, but they roundly dismiss 
the narrator’s assertion that desire, for a stone butch, is “heterosexual.”78  
Using psychoanalytic terms similar to the ones they purport to reject, Mar-
tin and Lyon explain that the truth claims made by stone butches are sim-
ply “the way they have rationalized their feelings against the inferior status 
of being a woman.”79  The authors then continue to connect the dots be-
tween butch behavior and the patriarchy, noting, “[s]trangely, it is those 
women who feel they were ‘born butch’ who tend to ape all the least desir-
  
 71. DEL MARTIN & PHYLLIS LYON, LESBIAN/WOMAN (1972). 
 72. DEL MARTIN & PHYLLIS LYON, LESBIAN/WOMAN (rev. ed. 1991). 
 73. MARTIN & LYON, supra note 71, at 66.  For example, Martin and Lyon rejected the psychoana-
lytic claim that certain sexual practices designed to “gratify the Lesbian’s thwarted maternal instinct.”  
Id.; see also Nancy J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Construction of the Gay Political Narrative, 12 
LAW & SEXUALITY 1, 18–23 (2003) (summarizing American Freudian psychoanalytic view of homo-
sexuality).  
 74. MARTIN & LYON, supra note 71, at 17.  The first chapter gets right to the point and is entitled 
“The Lesbian—Myth & Reality” because, as Martin and Lyon explain, “[s]o little is known about the 
Lesbian.”  Stressing the folly of role playing, Martin and Lyon note that many young lesbians “emu-
lated the heroine, Stephen Gordon [the protagonist from THE WELL OF LONELINESS], only to find that 
their lover, like Phyllis, was not looking for a male substitute.  For Lesbians are women who are at-
tracted to women.”  Id.   
 75. Id. at 6, 74. 
 76. Id. at 5.   
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 76. 
 79. MARTIN & LYON, supra note 71, at 76.  
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able characteristics of men.”80  On a positive note, Martin and Lyon ob-
serve that thanks to women’s liberation, the days of butch/femme role 
playing were largely over by 1972.81  In their estimation: “The minority of 
Lesbians who still cling to the traditional male-female or husband-wife 
pattern in their partnerships are more likely old-timers, gay bar habituées 
or working class women.”82 
Audre Lorde’s memoir, Zami: A New Spelling of My Name, was 
quickly added to the Women’s Studies canon when it was published in 
1982, and it remains there today.83  Lorde’s lyrical retelling of her experi-
ences with the gay-girl scene in New York City in the 1950s includes a 
damning description of the repressive and obligatory butch/femme identi-
ties adopted by gay bar habituées.84  Like Martin and Lyon, Lorde reports 
that she did not fit neatly within the butch/femme universe.  Lorde explains 
that she and a small handful of friends were “part of the ‘freaky’ bunch of 
lesbians who weren’t into role-playing, and who the butches and femmes . 
. . disparaged with the term Ky-Ky or AC/DC.  Ky-Ky was the same name 
that was used for gay-girls who slept with johns for money.  Prostitutes.”85 
However, unlike Martin and Lyon, Lorde does not bother to psycho-
analyze why the butches were butchy and the femmes were femmy.  To 
Lorde, the link between role-playing and hetero-patriarchy was clear: 
For some of us, however, role-playing reflected the depreciating 
attitudes toward women which we loathed in straight society.  It 
was a rejection of these roles that had drawn us to “the life” in the 
first place.  Instinctively, without particular theory or political po-
sition or dialectic, we recognized oppression as oppression, no 
matter where it came from.  But those lesbians who carved some 
niche in the pretend world of dominance/subordination, rejected 
what they called our “confused” life style, and they were in the 
majority.86 
Although later histories would re-examine the butch/femme lesbian 
communities of the 1950s through queer eyes, these early histories remain 
a searing indictment of group-held atypical gender norms.87  Like the sto-
  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 80. 
 82. Id. 
 83. AUDRE LORDE, ZAMI: A NEW SPELLING OF MY NAME (1982). 
 84. See generally id.  
 85. Id. at 178. 
 86. Id. at 221. 
 87. For a more sympathetic reading of the butch/femme bar communities, see ELIZABETH KENNEDY 
& MADELINE DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN 
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ries of the historical “passing women,” these first-hand accounts of 
butch/femme culture invalidate and deny transgender identities and em-
bodiments.  Butch/femme identities are not seen as anything more than 
gender play, with butches and femmes merely “aping” heterosexual behav-
ior.  As with the “passing women,” the deployment of gender was a con-
scious choice, but in the case of butch/femme norms it lacked any libera-
tory value. 
III.  COMMON GROUND 
As explored in the last section, a combination of personal experience, 
liberation ideology, and historical understanding can conspire to silence 
transgender truth claims.  Contemporary transgender narratives provide a 
first-hand account of gender as it is lived and experienced by some indi-
viduals at the beginning of the twenty-first century.  The fact that these 
narratives may ultimately have a different trajectory than our own gender 
narratives simply makes them different, not invalid.  We all have stories of 
navigating the gender system.  Being gendered, either by self or others, is 
an experience we all share, and there is likely no single truth to be born of 
that shared experience.  In this age of subjectivity, a charge of false con-
sciousness rings of hubris and carries its own disturbing pretense of he-
gemony. 
This section examines the commonality of gender narratives.  Borrow-
ing from my own gender atypical childhood, it examines the similarities 
between the stock transman narrative and that of a standard “tomboy” nar-
rative and asks whether perhaps we aren’t all a little genderqueer?88  It then 
discusses gender identity formation on the binary and the ways in which 
greater room for gender variance may actually facilitate transgender identi-
fications rather than render them obsolete as maintained by the progressive 
critique.  It concludes with a brief discussion of the integral role gender 
variance continues to play in gay and lesbian communities, despite the 
persistent efforts to establish sexuality as unrelated to or separate from 
gender or gender expression. 
A. Hello GenderQueer or Are You Talking About Me? 
As discussed above in Part II, the same progressive thinkers who dis-
miss transgender truth claims often value gender variance and the willing-
  
COMMUNITY (1994).  For a transhistorical discussion of transgender identities, see LESLIE FEINBERG, 
TRANS GENDER WARRIORS (1996).  
 88. See generally GENDERQUEER, supra note 25. 
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ness to transcend gender barriers.  However, the price of this gender vari-
ance is continued allegiance to the gender assigned at birth.  Gender vari-
ance that leads to bodily modification, a repudiation of the gender assigned 
at birth, or a desire to jump gender legally or socially, steps over a line and 
is deemed reactionary.  In this way, the progressive critique of gender al-
lows us to choose to wear our assigned gender aggressively, lightly, or 
even with a measure of dissonance, but we must wear it in order to be legi-
ble.  Thus, when we tell our female children, “you can be anything you 
want in the whole wide world,” the promise carries an unspoken caveat—
“except, of course, a boy.” 
When I first began my self-education process regarding transgender is-
sues, I was surprised to learn that my gender atypical childhood closely 
tracked the standard transman narrative prescribed by the most widely ac-
cepted standards of care.89  These standards regulate access to certain 
medical interventions and produce what Judith Butler refers to as the 
“dramaturges of transsexuality.”90  The politics of diagnosis are outside the 
scope of this article, and much has been written regarding the gate keeping 
function of the standards as well as the self-perpetuating nature of the re-
quired narratives, which individuals must repeat in order to gain the de-
sired access.91  However, the key factors of the gender atypical childhood 
actually described my childhood.  I would not have had to engage in any 
embellishment to satisfy the following elements of gender identity con-
flicts in childhood: “[C]ross dressing, playing with games and toys usually 
associated with the gender with which the child identifies; avoidance of the 
clothing, demeanor and play usually associated with the child’s sex and 
gender of assignment, preference for playmates or friends of the sex and 
gender with which the child identifies.”92 
When I was a little girl, my family encouraged me to engage in non-
traditional rough and tumble play.  Although I had both “boys” and “girls” 
toys, the “girls” toys stayed on the shelf.  Barbie could not hold a candle to 
G.I. Joe, and who would possibly want to play in a “Dream House” when 
  
 89. HARRY BENJAMIN INT’L GENDER DYSPHORIA ASS’N, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR GENDER 
IDENTITY DISORDERS (6th ed. Feb. 1, 2001), http://www.wpath.org/publications_standards.cfm [here-
inafter HBIGDA SOC].  The organization has recently changed its name to the World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health, Inc.  The International Conference on Transgender Law and 
Employment Policy, Inc. has promulgated alternative standards of care.  HEALTH LAW PROJECT, 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRANSGENDER LAW AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY, INC., HEALTH LAW 
STANDARDS OF CARE FOR TRANSSEXUALISM, http://www.transgerdercare.com/guidance/resources 
/ictlep_soc.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2007). 
 90. JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 71 (2004); Dean Spade, Mutilating Gender, in THE 
TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 325–27 (discussing “strategic deployment of trans-
sexual narrative”). 
 91. See Dean Spade, supra note 14, at 15 (critiquing gate keeping function of diagnosis). 
 92. HBIGDA SOC, supra note 89. 
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there were castles to storm and battles to choreograph?93  I was told that I 
could be a doctor or a lawyer or even an astronaut.  No one in my family 
raised an eyebrow when I donned my Batman outfit, peered out from under 
the hood, and proclaimed that I would be a senator one day.94 
As I read the transgender childhood summaries, I kept waiting to find 
one that would turn out like mine—one where the protagonist who was 
assigned female at birth grew up comfortable in her body and visibly fe-
male, but continued some of her tomboy pursuits and bought the occa-
sional item of clothing on the “wrong” side of the GAP.95  I never found 
that ultimate flash of recognition because I was reading about a different 
experience of gender.  I was reading transgender narratives, and my child-
hood story was missing one of the primary elements of gender identity 
disorder in childhood: the “stated desire to be the other sex.”96 
It is difficult to comprehend that desire when you have no personal ex-
perience with either internal or external gender dissonance.  I have never 
felt out of place in my female body, and I have never been mistaken for a 
man (as far as I know).  For me, gender is not a friction point in my life.  
My preference for gender neutral clothing is a relatively mild one.  Al-
though I value that I have a job where every day is casual Friday, I enjoyed 
my high femme years at a law firm and have never given up the purse 
habit.  My time as a power bow femme could be described as a form of 
drag, in that I was engaged in a self-conscious deployment of gender, but it 
did not feel like a cross-gender performance, nor was it necessarily in-
tended as a parody.97  My aim was transgressive.  As one of the few self-
identified lesbians at the law firm in the 1980s, I had decided I could best 
disrupt the partners’ understanding of the category of “lesbian” by looking, 
or trying to look, just like their WASPy wives.  I have since been told that 
  
 93. Jennine Head Miller, Curator of Domestic Life, Leisure, and Entertainment, at the Henry Ford 
museum, explains: “Introduced in 1962, the Barbie Dream House was a perfect backdrop for Barbie’s 
lifestyle of leisure and consumption of up-to-date goods.”  Jennine Head Miller, Henry Ford Museum: 
Pic of the Month, http://www.thehenryford.org/exhibits/pic/2001/01.jan.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
2007). 
 94. Of course, my Batman was the 1960s campy tights-wearing television hero played Adam West.  
See Hilary de Vries, Batman Battles for Big Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1989, at 11 (comparing 
“campy” 1960s television to Michael Keaton’s Batman). 
 95. The Gap offers a unisex shopping experience, but organizes its “male” and “female” clothing on 
opposite sides of the store.  No signs direct customers to the “men’s department.”  Instead, customers 
must rely on visual clues provided by the clothing and related displays.  The potential for confusion is 
reminiscent of the Seinfeld episode where George unwittingly selects a pair of “ladies frames” for his 
new glasses.  Seinfeld: The Glasses (NBC television broadcast May 30, 1993), available at http://www. 
seinfeldscripts.com/TheGlasses.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2006). 
 96. HBIGDA SOC, supra note 89. 
 97. Butler notes that “[t]he performance of drag plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of 
the performer and the gender that is being performed.”  BUTLER, supra note 23, at 137. 
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my gender romp was a disservice to butch lesbians.98  In retrospect, I can 
see how my actions, and indeed my very concept of what was transgres-
sive, were directly informed by negative views regarding cross-gender 
community norms discussed above in Part II.C.  By asserting myself as not 
male, I thought I was helping to destroy the “myth of the mannish les-
bian.”99 
Despite the different endings, I found it exceedingly enlightening to 
see the similarities between my childhood and that of many transgender 
individuals, and I resisted the impulse to reject the transgender stories as 
my own simply because they did not share a common outcome.  I had 
weathered a gender-atypical childhood without experiencing the desire to 
modify my body or otherwise repudiate the gender I was assigned at birth.  
Did this mean that I was better adjusted than the transman because I could 
navigate the cultural construct of gender without becoming a victim to its 
literal demands?  Or, was it just as possible that, unlike the transman, I was 
hopelessly domesticated as illustrated by my not-so-transgressive shenani-
gans at the law firm—socialized to the point where everything is possible 
except living in a gender different from the one assigned at birth? 
These dueling propositions are both built on claims of false conscious-
ness paired with transformative vision.  In the first instance, I am possessed 
of great vision whereas the transman is trapped in a literal application of 
gender.  In the second, I suffer from a copious lack of vision whereas the 
transman is able to see beyond labels.  Neither is necessarily true.  The way 
I choose to define myself in the world and within the gender system is 
simply different from that of someone who identifies as transgender.  The 
important thing I learned, however, was that no matter how fundamental 
that difference might be, it is rooted in a basic commonality that provides 
an undeniable degree of kinship. 
Indeed, gender variant behavior has served as a longstanding bridge 
between the transgender and gay and lesbian communities.  The standards 
for care quoted above note that in actuality, relatively “few” gender variant 
children grow up to be transsexuals, although “many eventually develop a 
homosexual orientation.”100  This makes one wonder about the efficacy of 
diagnosis or perhaps it suggests that I actually am transgender.  According 
to the early sexologists, “contrary sexual feelings” were the result of a 
form of sexual inversion that was marked by same-sex libidinal object 
choice, as well as a penchant for wearing pants and an aversion to needle-
  
 98. At the time, I only understood “butch” to be an adjective.  Contra S. BEAR BERGMAN, BUTCH IS 
A NOUN (2006).   
 99. Esther Newton, The Mythic Mannish Lesbian: Radclyffe Hall and the New Woman, in HIDDEN 
FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY & LESBIAN PAST 281, 282 (Martin Duberman et al. eds., 1989).   
 100. HBIGDA SOC, supra note 89. 
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work.101  I plead guilty on all counts and discuss the connection between 
gender variance and homosexuality further in section C below. 
In some circles, the term “genderqueer” has emerged as an umbrella 
category that is distinguished by its oppositional stance to gender and its 
critique of the binary.102  The tensions existing between the terms gender-
queer and transsexual and their associated communities are beyond the 
scope of this article and far exceed my level of expertise, but for the pur-
poses of this discussion, it can be said that genderqueer is a subset of 
transgender.103  Genderqueer’s oppositional stance may represent a point of 
entry for many who otherwise suffer from the progressive resistance to 
transgender truth claims.  In its broadest sense, genderqueer embraces a 
fluidity of gender roles and behaviors that encompasses the type of gender 
variance generally approved within the progressive understanding of gen-
der.  However, genderqueer parts company with the progressive critique in 
that it rejects not simply the gender role behavior and expectations associ-
ated with one’s gender assigned at birth, but the act or meaning of that 
assignment.104  In this way, genderqueer advances a greater degree of gen-
der self-definition and individual agency than the progressive critique. 
Genderqueer also marks the generation gap between the twenty-
somethings and the rest of us.  On more than one occasion, I have been 
read as genderqueer by students.  I believe their characterization is based 
on my clothing choices, absence of stereotypical feminine grooming habits 
(i.e., make-up), and the open knowledge that I’m a lesbian.  The first time 
this happened, my own transphobia got the best of me, and I literally went 
running to the shoe department at Bloomingdale’s looking for something 
“a little less clunky.”  On reflection, I believe that the descriptor gender-
queer provides a potentially useful connection between my own post-
feminist gender agnosticism and the contemporary transgender narrative.  
Although the identity category genderqueer carries no personal resonance 
for me, it does provide a strategic location for theorizing gender that is not 
overly consumed with slaying the long-dead dragons of Freudian thought. 
  
 101. I am not making this up.  Havelock Ellis specifically noted that female inverts sometimes dis-
play a “dislike and . . . incapacity for needlework and other domestic occupations, while there is often 
capacity for athletics.”  HAVELOCK ELLIS & JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS, SEXUAL INVERSION (1897), 
excerpted in NINETEENTH-CENTURY WRITINGS ON HOMOSEXUALITY: A SOURCEBOOK 100 (Chris 
White ed., 1999).   
 102. Wilchins, Queerer Bodies, in GENDERQUEER, supra note 25, at 46 (noting that “[g]ender-
queerness is by definition unique, private, and profoundly different”). 
 103. For a taste of the tension existing between the transsexual communities and those who identity 
as genderqueer, see Pauline Park, GenderPAC, the Transgender Rights Movement and the Perils of a 
Post-Identity Politics Paradigm, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 747 (2003).   
 104. Wilchins notes that the challenge of genderqueereness is to question “the whole narrow, out-
dated notion of applying binary norms to bodies and genders.”  Wilchins, supra note 102, at 44.   
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Genderqueer recognizes that gender matters.  It rejects but does not 
deny the binary.  In this way, the notion of genderqueer differs dramati-
cally from the aspirational view of gender discussed in Part II.  Whereas 
the latter maintains that the binary is not real and, therefore, cannot define 
you, genderqueer allows for the realness of gender but declares it to be 
ultimately malleable and fluid.  Despite its intellectual appeal, I know 
many folks my age that would be uncomfortable with the identity category 
of genderqueer precisely because of the way it foregrounds gender.  The 
label genderqueer signals an oppositional stance to gender as a primary 
mode of identification.  As a gender agnostic, this personally places too 
much emphasis on gender, but I recognize that on this point I am just being 
stubborn.  My partner/wife likens my resistance to Radclyffe Hall’s insis-
tence that she was a congenital invert long after the sexologists’ ship had 
sailed.105  This has prompted me to repeatedly ask her whether I really look 
genderqueer, to which she will only reply, “if the shoe fits.” 
B. We All Experience Gender 
Even if you reject the proposition that we are all a little genderqueer, 
you will have to allow that we all experience gender, and to varying ex-
tents we all participate in the gender system.106  I recall making this point 
during a meeting regarding student public interest and pro bono work.  
When the topic turned to transgender advocacy, a colleague remarked that 
s/he “wasn’t feeling it” because the topic was too limited, it affected too 
few people, and, indeed, it might alienate students who would otherwise be 
interested in working in the public interest.  Several months later, another 
colleague voiced a similar concern when s/he expressed skepticism over 
my new research agenda (i.e., transgender legal issues), stating: “I don’t 
know how much of a social problem this is actually going to turn out to 
be.”  Both of these comments emphasize the minoritizing nature of trans-
gender issues, and they both fail to apprehend the universal, albeit cultur-
ally contingent, experience of gender.107 
This minoritizing view of gender is consistent with the notion that 
there is something hopelessly myopic and conventional in the way trans-
gender individuals cling to gender and desire gender recognition.  It seems 
  
 105. See infra text accompanying notes 150–55. 
 106. Wilchins argues that “[i]n a society where femininity is feared and loathed, all women are gen-
derqueer.  In a culture where masculinity is defined by having sex with women and femininity by 
having sex with men, all gay people are genderqueer.”  Wilchins, A Continuous Nonverbal Communi-
cation, in GENDERQUEER, supra note 25, at 12–13. 
 107. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has written on the universalizing and minoritizing aspects of homo-
sexuality.  See SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 1.   
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to present an intractable divide with the stated progressive agenda to tran-
scend gender role limitations and expectations.  How can we reconcile, the 
reasoning goes, the fact that many of us bristle at the restraints of gender 
whereas as others actively seek refuge within the very system we hope to 
render obsolete?108  It seems that at the end of the day, the only thing to say 
with a shrug is: gender: some of us can’t live within it—others can’t live 
without it. 
When faced with this double bind, the natural reaction seems to be to 
dismiss the transgender assertions regarding the importance of gender be-
cause it is not possible for gender to be both a restrictive life-denying force 
and a necessary pre-condition for human flourishing.109  I believe that this 
double bind has been overstated and neglects our core commonality of 
being gendered—whether by self or by others.  The characterization that 
transgender individuals are running back into the embrace of gender per-
petuates the notion of the transgender individuals as reactionary, as op-
posed to the visionary individuals who are committed to seeing past gen-
der. 
Although at first glance it might seem that the two groups are working 
at cross purposes, when viewed from a slightly different angle it can just as 
easily be said that both of us are trying to achieve escape velocity from the 
expectations and limitations imposed on us by virtue of the assignment of 
gender at birth.  Ultimately, trans and non–trans alike are attempting to 
navigate the gender system in the hope of finding space to live.  This is a 
primary unifying force, and it is the primary reason (beyond a basic and 
unwavering commitment to human rights) that transgender issues are of 
importance to every one of us.  Unfortunately, non-trans individuals often 
fail to see the extent of this commonality because, for us, it is often easy to 
forget that we are actively gendered.110  Indeed, this is precisely the prob-
lem; for many of us gender is simply a non-issue.  It is not a source of daily 
friction and discomfort. 
One of the things that seems particularly perplexing to non-trans indi-
viduals is why transgender narratives move across the binary.  As dis-
  
 108. Butler writes: “[A] livable life does require various degrees of stability.  In the same way that a 
life for which no categories of recognition exist is not a livable life, so a life for which these categories 
constitute unlivable constraint is not an acceptable option.”  BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER, supra note 
90, at 8. 
 109. Butler writes:  
The normative aspiration at work here has to do with the ability to live and breathe and 
move and would no doubt belong somewhere in what is called a philosophy of freedom.  
The thought of a possible life is only an indulgence for those who already know themselves 
to be possible.  For those who are still looking to become possible, possibility is a necessity. 
Id. at 31. 
 110. RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
WHITENESS 142 (1993).  
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cussed in the immediate prior section, some individuals who identify as 
transgender and genderqueer eschew gender and actively try to create a 
legible subjectivity without gender markers.  However, a significant por-
tion of transgender individuals experience distress and difficulty when they 
repudiate the gender they were assigned at birth and attempt to secure a 
different set of gender markers.  Although non-trans progressive individu-
als support the repudiation of the set of expectations assigned at birth via 
the proxy of gender, they often fail to grasp why the repudiation of one’s 
assigned gender necessarily leads to identification as a different gender.  
You can almost hear the progressive thinker ruminating: “I didn’t jump 
ship.  No sir-ree.  I stayed the course and worked to change the system 
from within my assigned gender.  I stayed true to my assigned gender.” 
Of course, this begs the question of why an assignment of gender at 
birth based on a series of visual and physical cues continues to carry such 
weight.  If it is an irrelevancy and it cannot control our destinies, then why 
not respect the right of individuals to choose or to define their own gender?  
Scarcely any of the progressive thinkers uncomfortable with transgender 
requests for gender self-definition would argue the same in the case of in-
dividuals who are intersexed.111  The interesexed are different, the argu-
ment goes, because they experience incongruence between physical gender 
and the gender assigned at birth.112  This reasoning privileges the physical 
as the true situs of gender.  An individual is required to maintain loyalty to 
the gender assigned at birth unless there are verifiable physical anomalies 
that put the assignment in question ab initio.  The intersex dilemma also 
reveals that the assignment of gender at birth is an imperfect practice that 
is not above putting a thumb on the scale to tip the balance by way of sur-
gical intervention.113  The progressive critique maintains that the desire to 
repudiate the gender assigned at birth cedes too much power to the socially 
constructed gender system, but it fails to question the act of initial assign-
  
 111. See generally SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED (1998) (defining intersex-
uality and the medical construction of gender).  There are many genetic, hormonal, or anatomical 
variations which make a person’s sex ambiguous, such as Klinefelter Syndrome and Adrenal Hyperpla-
sia.  Julie Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and 
Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 278–90 (1999).  Medical professionals usually assign intersex infants a 
sex and surgically alter the infant’s body to conform to that designation.  Id. at 272.  An increasingly 
vocal intersex movement denounces this form of surgical intervention as genital mutilation.  Cheryl 
Chase, Hermaphrodites with Attitude: Mapping the Emergence of Intersex Political Activism, in THE 
TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 300.  The intersex movement opposes surgical 
intervention until the intersex individual is old enough to make an informed choice.  Id. at 306–07.   
 112. Butler notes a slightly different distinction when she writes: “[T]echnology is a resource to 
which some people want access, it is also an imposition from which others seek to be freed.”  BUTLER, 
UNDOING GENDER, supra note 90, at 11. 
 113. For a discussion of the types of surgical procedures performed on infants, see KESSLER, supra 
note 111, at 33–51. 
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ment.  In this way, it denies individual agency and cedes the ultimate 
power of naming to a set of purportedly “objective” physical criteria that 
are nonetheless a socially constructed component of the gender system.114 
To the non-trans-identified, the apparent increase in the number of in-
dividuals who desire to move across the binary seems counter-intuitive 
given that there is currently considerable social room to express gender 
variant behavior.115  Under this rationale, the gender assigned at birth now, 
more than ever, is an irrelevancy because the categories of woman and 
man—to the extent that they are stable categories—are greatly expanded.  
Although it is certainly true that one’s gender assigned at birth allows for 
greater freedom of expression, it is also true that one’s target gender also 
provides greater freedom.  Thus, a movement across the binary need not be 
seen as the exchange of one too-small identity for another.  Provided nei-
ther category is prohibitively constraining, and either category can be con-
ducive to human flourishing, then a movement between categories would 
seem neutral.  When the progressive critique asserts that such movement 
reinforces an oppressive gender system, it denies agency in the name of 
greater freedom but also accepts the initial process of categorization as 
beyond challenge. 
The progressive bewilderment with movement across the binary re-
flects the larger belief that gender doesn’t matter, but it also reveals a spe-
cific rejection of a binary spectrum of behavior that ranges from male to 
female.  For many of us born in the 1960s and 1970s, the gender we had 
been assigned at birth was small and confining.  Although the life choices 
we made often placed us outside of the traditional definition of “woman” 
(or “man”), we did not believe that every step we took beyond our assigned 
gender necessarily propelled us toward the other gender.  For example, 
when I was born in 1961, Betty Friedan had yet to publish her manifesto, 
Ozzie and Harriet was still on the air, and women made up 3.5% of the 
nation’s law students.116  There was no Title VII, no maternity leave, help 
  
 114. ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
SEXUALITY (2000). 
 115. Dylan Vade offers a “non-linear” view of gender that rejects a spectrum that runs from male to 
female.  Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal Concep-
tualization of Gender That’s More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253 
(2005). 
 116. Betty Friedan published THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE in 1963.  Fox, supra note 41.  The book is 
credited with starting what is referred to as the second wave of feminism.  Id.  “The Adventures of 
Ozzie and Harriet” premiered on television in 1952 and ran for fourteen seasons, ending in 1966.  
Museum of Broadcast Communications, The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet, http://www.museum.tv 
/archives/etv/A/htmlA/adventuresof/adventuresof.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).  The American Bar 
Association maintains law school enrollment figures based on gender.  AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF 
LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, FIRST YEAR AND TOTAL J.D. ENROLLMENTS BY GENDER, 
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/stats%20-%206.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2007). 
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wanted ads were segregated based on sex, and women attended college in 
order to secure a “Mrs.” Degree.117  By the time I entered law school in 
1981, women made up 35.8% of the law students nationwide and Sandra 
Day O’Connor had just been appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court.118   
In the space of twenty years, the changes that had taken place in terms 
of role options for women (at least white middle class women) were ex-
traordinary.119  As the commercial said, we had “come a long way,” but I 
never understood that journey to be unidirectional.120  With each non-
traditional choice we made, we increased the distance between our lives 
and that restrictive category of “woman” to the point where the early 1960s 
category of “woman” was largely historical.  However, the range of possi-
bilities that we explored outside the traditional category of “woman” were 
not coded “man” and our actions did not take place on a tightly drawn 
spectrum that ran from male to female.  We were not rushing to become 
men and, besides, we knew plenty of people who were actively trying to 
break out of that equally moribund and confining category.  The space 
outside “woman” belonged to the realm of the human yet to be defined. 
My insistence—that women who sought greater role options were not 
trying to become men—echoes a particular sensitivity on the part of sec-
ond wave feminists to the masculine-baiting that historically dogged ef-
forts to secure greater rights for women.  Early arguments against allowing 
women access to higher education stressed the masculinizing effects of 
education on the female form.121  Later, the popularized version of penis 
envy provided a psychoanalytic explanation for women who sought full 
  
 117. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2007); The Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2007).  The desegregation of “help wanted” ads was one 
of the first goals established by the National Organization for Women (NOW) when it was formed in 
1966.  Nat’l Org. for Women, Highlights from NOW’s FORTY Fearless Years, http://www.now.org 
/history/timeline.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) issued revised guidelines in 1968 clarifying that that gender-segregated job listings violated 
Title VII.  EEOC – Milestones, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/milestones/1968.html (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2007).   
 118. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 116.  Justice O’Conner was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court by 
President Ronald Regan in 1981 and was confirmed by a unanimous Senate.  Linda Greenhouse, Jus-
tice O’Connor Seated on Nation’s High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1981, § 1, at 8. 
 119. See David Leonhardt, Scant Progress on Closing Gap in Women’s Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
2006, § 1, at 1. 
 120. In 1968, Philip Morris introduced a cigarette for women with an advertising campaign that 
touted the liberating effects of smoking and announced that “you’ve come a long way.”  See E. Michael 
Jones, The Torches of Freedom Campaign: Behaviorism, Advertising and the Rise of the American 
Empire, CULTURE WARS, Apr.–June 1999, http://www.culturewars.com/CultureWars/1999/torches. 
html. 
 121. See, e.g., Edward H. Clarke, Sex in Education or, A Fair Chance for Girls 11–14, 125–34 
(1873), reprinted in ROOT OF BITTERNESS: DOCUMENTS OF THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
WOMEN 330, 331 (Nancy F. Cott et al. eds., 1996) (arguing exposure to education damages female 
reproductive health). 
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inclusion in public life.122  Betty Friedan responded to the specter that lib-
eration would lead to a masculine race of cigar-chomping, skirt-chasing 
women when she initially turned her back on lesbian members of NOW, 
referring to them as the Lavender Menace.123  As explained in Part II.C 
above, Martin and Lyon went to considerable lengths to address and dis-
miss the psychoanalytic view of lesbians as “pseudo men.”124  Even today 
this sort of argument figures prominently in right-wing Hillary-bashing and 
the caricature of the emasculating “femi-nazi.”125 
Obviously, this well-worn denial that feminists secretly want to be-
come men is complicated by the fact that, come to find out, some individu-
als who are assigned female at birth actually do desire to be socially and 
legally recognized as male.126  Moreover, some desire bodily modification 
that may or may not include a constructed penis which, of course, seems to 
open up that old bugaboo of penis envy that feminism has spent so much 
time debunking.127  Indeed, during the early days of the second wave, 
Freudian psychology was singled out as a primary font of gender role 
stereotyping and oppression.128  Although feminism generally dismissed a 
stripped down version of penis envy as the egomaniacal ranting of a typical 
male, the French post-structuralists rehabilitated Freud by emphasizing the 
metaphorical or symbolic qualities of the penis.129  Rejecting the actual 
desire for a penis as nonsensical, they theorized that women didn’t crave a 
penis, but rather the symbolic power represented by the penis in a male-
dominated capitalist society.130  As discussed above in Part II.C, Katz ac-
cepts this as an explanation for “passing women” whom he tells us coveted 
merely the representational “phallus” and certainly not the physical pe-
nis.131  To the non-trans individual, this reworking of penis envy made 
sense.  It stood up to the misogynist masculine-baiting by denying the 
  
 122. See Susan J. Douglas, Personal Influence and the Bracketing of Women’s History, 608 ANNALS 
41, 44 (2006) (noting women who failed to relinquished jobs at the end of Work War II were branded 
as neurotics who suffered from “penis envy”). 
 123. See KARLA JAY, TALES OF THE LAVENDER MENACE: A MEMOIR OF LIBERATION (2000). 
 124. See MARTIN & LYON, supra note 71. 
 125. David Brock, The Slur Against Hillary Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2000, at A25 (discussing 
the “Hillary bashing gravy train”).  Erik Eckholm, From Right, a Rain of Anti-Clinton Salvos, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 26, 1994, § 1, at 1 (noting Rush Limbaugh as responsible for the term “femi-nazi”). 
 126. Wilchins, Deconstructing Trans, in GENDERQUEER, supra note 25, at 56 (noting feminists had to 
explain they were “not trying to be men”). 
 127. As noted earlier, both deBeauvoir and Friedan challenged Freud’s assertion that “anatomy is 
destiny.”  See supra note 30.  More generally, Freud has been characterized as “the forefather of mod-
ern misogyny” and “among the foremost inventors of modern homophobia.”  Paul Robinson, Freud 
and Homosexuality, in WHOSE FREUD?, supra note 30, at 144. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See generally CHRIS WEEDON, FEMINIST PRACTICE & POSTSRUCTURALIST THEORY 42–70 
(1997). 
 130. KATZ, supra note 24, at 209. 
 131. Id. 
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premise that liberated women wanted to become men and accurately re-
flecting the then-current demands of the second wave of feminism for in-
creased role options for women.  Who wouldn’t envy power? 
Both the feminist rejoinder to penis envy and the post-structuralist re-
working of penis envy reject out of hand the possibility that an individual 
assigned female at birth could desire bodily modification that would in-
clude a penis.  According to the feminist, the desire for a penis is a lie.  
According to the post-structuralist, the desire may be true, but only on a 
symbolic level because the penis is a metaphor.  In the face of these theo-
retical claims, some transgender narratives report the desire for bodily 
modification and severe distress when access to such modification is im-
peded.  This presents a clear challenge for individuals who, like me, have 
been raised on the notion that gender is an extended metaphor.  The chal-
lenge is to integrate the reality of transgender experiences into our under-
standing of the gender system and our own relationship to gender. 
The first step is to recognize that many of the insights that we received 
as enlightened wisdom in our Women’s Studies courses were historically 
specific, in that they were aimed squarely at displacing then-predominant 
views regarding gender in general and the feminine in particular.  As illus-
trated by the case of Lyon and Martin, well-meaning efforts in the 1970s to 
establish new identities had the direct effect of silencing and repudiating 
alternative trans identities.  Second, we have to admit that gender matters 
and it carries real life consequences—for all of us.  Gender is not the result 
of massive Cold War brainwashing used to such great effect in the Man-
churian Candidate nor is it a trendy French metaphor.132  In real life, some 
individuals report that their gender assigned at birth does not coincide with 
their internal sense of gender.  They also report a desire to express their 
internal gender in ways that may or may not include bodily modification.  
A necessary corollary of this expression is the need for their internal gen-
der to be recognized socially and legally.  When the progressive critique 
denies the right to gender self-definition, it diminishes all of us who par-
ticipate in the gender system.  We all experience gender, but we do so in 
different ways and to different degrees. 
  
 132. Jack Hitt, Return of the Brainwashing Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, § 6, at 116 (explain-
ing plot of 1962 film and noting “brainwashing is back”). 
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C. “God Save the Nellie Queens”133 
As noted above, both my early tomboy narrative and my experience as 
a woman born during the second half of the twentieth century at a time of 
rapidly expanding role options produce points of commonality with con-
temporary transgender narratives.  There remains one additional and unde-
niable point of convergence.  Despite efforts to distance gay and lesbian 
identities from cross gender stereotypes, drag and other forms of gender 
bending remain an integral cultural component of many gay and lesbian 
communities.  Indeed, the early sexologists considered homosexual object 
choice to be one component of a larger, naturally occurring phenomenon of 
gender inversion where women acted (and felt) like men and men acted 
(and felt) like women.134  At the time, the inherent heterosexual nature of 
desire was so strongly presumed that when a female-assigned person re-
ported a female sexual object choice, she was necessarily exhibiting cross 
gender behavior.135  According to Krafft-Ebing’s scale of inversion, same-
sex object choice without any other cross-gender behavior would warrant 
classification on the first rung of inversion.136  The gradations of inversion 
increased in severity as homosexual desire was joined with ever greater 
degrees of cross-gender behavior and identification until the subject re-
ported total repudiation of the gender assigned at birth and active identifi-
cation with the target gender.137 
The presumption that sexual desire was naturally heterosexual is used 
to illustrate the heteronormative bias of the sexologists, and they are often 
  
 133. Interview with George, in THE WORD IS OUT: THE STORIES OF SOME OF OUR LIVES 73 (Nancy 
Adair & Casey Adair, eds., 1978) (the title of a song sung to the tune of “God Save the Queen” by 
patrons at a gay bar in the 1950s). 
 134. Krafft-Ebing characterized “inversion” as a process of development of the psycho-sexual char-
acter which manifests as “a sexual instinct . . . which is the exact opposite of that characteristic of the 
sex to which the individual belongs.”  R. VON KRAFFT-EBING, PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS: A MEDICO-
LEGAL STUDY 187 (Charles Gilbert Chaddock trans., F.A. Davis Co. 7th ed. 1920). 
 135. A German physician, Karl Westphal, who is generally identified as the author of the first medi-
cal article on homosexuality published in 1869, referred to homosexuality as “contrary sexual feeling.”  
JENNIFER TERRY, AN AMERICAN OBSESSION: SCIENCE MEDICINE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY IN MODERN 
SOCIETY 36, 45 (1999).   
 136. See Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From THE WELL OF LONELINESS to the Boy 
Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 415–16 (2000) (restating four stages of “psychical hermaphroditism,” 
“homo-sexual individuals, or urnings,” “effeminiation and viraginity,” and “androgyny and gynan-
dry”).   
 137. The first two of the four stages on Krafft-Ebing’s inversion scale measured the degree of non-
normative objective choice.  Id. at 416.  In the first stage, “contrary sexual feeling” is primary, but there 
is some heterosexual attraction.  KRAFFT-EBING, supra note 134, at 230 (describing “psychical her-
maphroditism”).  In stage two, the “contrary sexual feeling” is exclusive.  Id. at 255 (describing “homo-
sexual individuals or Urnings”).  Only in stages three and four does the inversion manifest itself with 
respect to the individual’s “character and mental personality.”  Id. at 255, 279, 304 (describing stages 
two, three, and four). 
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blamed for erroneously and inextricably linking homosexuality with gen-
der variant behavior.138  As noted above, the desire on the part of many gay 
advocates to distance themselves from gender variant behavior reflected 
the perceived need to counter prevailing scientific views regarding homo-
sexuality.  In addition, cross-gender behavior forms the core of many ho-
mophobic stereotypes and animates homophobic violence.139 
We all know that homophobic slurs are frequently used not to signal 
actual homosexual activity or desire but to indicate that the object of the 
slur has stepped beyond the acceptable role for her/his assigned gender.140  
For example, a strong assertive woman who excels in business may be 
called a dyke, whereas the sensitive artistic man may be dismissed as a fag.  
Indeed, some legal scholars have gone as far as to suggest that discrimina-
tion against homosexuals is most appropriately (and productively) ana-
lyzed as gender discrimination.141  For example, when the law prohibits a 
man from marrying another man, it is discriminating on the basis of gender 
because the man would be able to marry a man if he were a woman.142  
Unfortunately, efforts to combat these slurs and stereotypes have often 
focused on a denial of cross-gender behavior as opposed to a condemna-
tion of the fact that it remains acceptable to respond to such behavior with 
ridicule, disgust, and violence. 
Although the sexologists have been credited with linking (erroneously, 
some would argue) homosexuality with gender variant behavior, it is im-
portant to remember that their act of naming and mapping the homosexual 
was not an entirely top down endeavor.143  Inverts participated in the re-
  
 138. Foucault asserted that under the sexologists’ theories the newly minted homosexual “was char-
acterized . . . less by a type of sexual relations than by a certain way of inverting the masculine and the 
feminine in oneself.”  1 FOUCAULT, supra note 68, at 43; see also SEDWICK, supra note 2, at 45–47 
(1990) (discussing Foucault’s critique of inversion).  Foucault noted that “[h]omosexuality appeared as 
one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of inte-
rior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul.”  1 FOUCAULT, supra note 68, at 43.   
 139. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of 
“Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 3 
(1995). 
 140. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187 
(1988) (attributing disapproval of homosexuality to “reaction to the violation of gender norms”). 
 141. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimina-
tion, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (arguing in favor of equal protection claim based on gender). 
 142. Id.  See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (ruling Hawaii marriage law discrimi-
nates on its face based on gender and, therefore, implicates the equal protection clause of the Hawaii 
Constitution). 
 143. Foucault described “reverse discourse as the ability of the subjects of study to appropriate the 
language and pronouncements of their elite observers and use it to articulate a program for reform.”  1 
FOUCAULT, supra note 68, at 43.  Foucault argued that the sexologists made possible the formation of a 
“reverse” discourse: “[H]omosexuality began to speak [o]n its own behalf, to demand that its legiti-
macy or ‘naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by 
which it was medically disqualified.”  Id. 
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search and the production of the resulting description of populations, 
communities, and practices.144  In this way, the addition of the “T” to the 
already existing LGB in the late 1990s was not a random coalition.  It re-
flects a deep historical affiliation, shared cultural space, and a common 
source of oppression.145 
It is now well-known that transgender individuals were instrumental in 
the early gay liberation period immediately following Stonewall but were 
increasingly marginalized and displaced by both feminism and identity 
politics.146  We have seen how efforts at positive identity formation in the 
1970s obliterated and invalidated transgender realities in their rush to re-
pudiate Freudian theories and counter destructive stereotypes.  This nega-
tion of transgender realities influenced both how we understood history 
and how we understood ourselves.  Contemporary gay identity politics 
constructed a “straight-acting” gay subject who was gender conforming in 
all respect but desire (assuming desire has a gender).147  The continuing 
resistance to transgender issues within the mainstream lesbian and gay 
advocacy organizations and within the lesbian and gay communities in 
general is not surprising given this decades-long denial and marginaliza-
tion of transgender identities.148  However, the formal inclusion of trans-
gender issues represents an important step toward embracing our common 
history and our common (albeit not uncomplicated) connection to gender. 
IV.  IDENTITIES AND THE LAW 
Transgender narratives reject the unassailable congruence between the 
gender assigned at birth and gender identity.  They assert and attest to the 
reality of gender and the degree of security that can be produced by an 
easily legible gender.  Most forcefully, they demand a right to gender self-
  
 144. Henry Minton has published a comprehensive study of the relationship.  See HENRY L. MINTON, 
DEPARTING FROM DEVIANCE: A HISTORY OF HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS AND EMANCIPATORY SCIENCE IN 
AMERICA (2002) (describing relationship between homosexual activists and science in the United 
States from the 1930s until the 1973).   
 145. Much of the early writing on sexuality contained themes relating to the “third sex.”  Magnus 
Hirshfield, who is most widely associated with his Institute for Sexual Science and his efforts to de-
criminalize sodomy in Germany, was deeply interested in what he referred to as “intermediaries.”  In 
his 1910 book TRANSVESTITES in 1919, he distinguished transvestites from homosexuals.  MAGNUS 
HIRSCHFIELD, TRANSVESTITES (Michael A. Lombardi-Nash trans., 1991).  His institute performed its 
first genital surgery in 1922.  MEYEROWITZ, supra note 29, at 19. 
 146. For an anthropological discussion of shared cultural space see Esther Newton, Mother Camp, in 
THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 121–30. 
 147. Yoshino, supra note 70, at 844. 
 148. See supra note 4 (discussing refusal of HRC to advocate for addition of sexual identity to 
ENDA). 
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definition that challenges existing categories of man/woman and necessar-
ily calls into question what we mean when we talk about same-sex desire. 
Some progressive resistance to transgender truth claims has been 
rooted in the perceived threat to existing identity categories.  Lesbian 
communities in particular have had difficulty incorporating transgender 
possibilities despite the common experience of gender discussed in the 
prior section.  This section first reminds us that identity formation is his-
torically contingent and urges us to heal the generational divide by further-
ing a process of identity formation that can articulate both commonality 
and difference. 
It also discusses the potential opportunities represented by the use of 
queer as a strategic position of alliance and argues that, at base, we are all 
probably a little bit queer.  Finally, it asks us to imagine what types of legal 
reform would be necessary to create space for the type of gender self-
definition envisioned and demanded by the transgender narrative—one that 
respects internal gender identity, gender expression, and gender embodi-
ment. 
A. The Shifting Sands of Identity 
My initial interest in transgender issues arose while I was doing re-
search for an article on the obscenity trials of the 1928 novel by Radclyffe 
Hall, The Well of Loneliness.149  The Well is frequently described as the 
most influential lesbian novel of all time.150  As I busily explored the simi-
larities between the arguments used to condemn The Well and contempo-
rary anti-gay rhetoric, a series of online searches revealed to me the extent 
to which the book also resonates within certain transgender communi-
ties.151  In retrospect, the duality of the book and its author is obvious, but I 
was so accustomed to denying the reality of gender that I interpreted the 
gender expression of the protagonist as some form of art deco lesbian chic.  
Indeed, in my article I had refused to cite an early biography of Hall that 
had identified her as a “transvestite” because I considered its perspective 
compromised by an unreflective acceptance of gender inversion.152  I never 
consider whether my unreflective denial of gender inversion had comprised 
my perspective. 
  
 149. Knauer, supra note 136.   
 150. See REBECCA O’ROURKE, REFLECTING ON THE WELL OF LONELINESS (1989) (reporting results 
of surveys regarding impact of THE WELL on individual women). 
 151. See Heather K. Love, Selections from “Spoiled Identity”: Stephen Gordon’s Loneliness and the 
Difficulties of Queer History, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra, at 521 (discussing his-
torically shifting identities). 
 152. LOVAT DICKSON, RADCLYFFE HALL AT THE WELL OF LONELINESS: A SAPPHIC CHRONICLE 
(1975). 
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As noted above in Part III, it is curious that Hall chose to base her 
novel on the Victorian taxonomies of the sexologists rather than the mod-
ern psychoanalytic model of human sexuality.153  Although I had always 
thought that Hall’s continued identification as a “congenital invert” was 
somewhat old-fashioned, I reasoned that it was a superior strategic 
choice.154  Clearly, it was easier to craft a platform for tolerance and accep-
tance on a “born that way” argument than on any insight that could be gar-
nered from either Oedipus or Electra.155  It did not occur to me that perhaps 
Hall did not adopt the label homosexual because she did not see herself as 
a homosexual. 
It was not until I experienced my own personal frisson at the term gen-
derqueer that I began to look sympathetically on individuals, such as Hall, 
whose identity formations took place under a prevailing historical model 
only to have that model overtaken by newer and more culturally relevant 
models.  In terms of a contemporary example, Susan Sontag comes to mind 
as an individual who may have existed on this sort of historical cusp.156  
She staunchly refused to identify as lesbian or gay despite wide reports 
indicating the contrary.157  Like many, I had attributed Sontag’s refusal to 
self-identify as simple homophobic denial that she tried to justify in the 
name of preserving (or obscuring) authorial voice.158  It never occurred to 
me that she might have refused to identify as lesbian or gay simply because 
she didn’t identify as lesbian or gay.159  My reaction reflects an odd feature 
  
 153. The sexologist Havelock Ellis provided a “Commentary” to THE WELL that was published in the 
novel’s earlier editions.  Havelock Ellis, Commentary to THE WELL OF LONELINESS (Covici Friede 
1932) (1928).  Hall also incorporated the work of Krafft-Ebing in the text of THE WELL.  The protago-
nist turns to one of his books, most likely PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS, to learn about her true nature.  
RADCLYFFE HALL, THE WELL OF LONELINESS 202 (Anchor Books 1990) (1928).  Before writing THE 
WELL, Hall and her partner, Una Troubridge, read aloud from Ellis’s STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
SEX and Krafft-Ebing’s PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS.  DIANA SOUHAMI, THE TRIALS OF RADCLYFFE 
HALL xix (1999). 
 154. Hall referred to herself as an “invert.”  Letter from Radcylffe Hall to Gorham Munson (June 2, 
1934), http://www.datalounge.net/network/pages/lha/pblct/intrhall.htm#Letter. 
 155. The psycho-analytic model of homosexuality “understood homosexuality not in terms of a 
hereditary or congenital defect that manifested itself in sexual inversion but as perversions of the nor-
mal sex drive caused by the stresses and strains of psychosexual development.”  TERRY, supra note 
135, at 56.  
 156. Margalit Fox, Susan Sontag, Social Critic with Verve Dies at 71, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2004, at 
A1. 
 157. Janny Scott, Life, and Death, Examined, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at E29 (explaining Sontag 
was “a private person”). 
 158. Michael Bronski, Notes on ‘Susan’: Would Susan Sontag have Been as Famous if She’d Come 
Out as a Lesbian? Doubtful, GULLY, Feb. 19, 2005, http://www.thegully.com/essays/gaymundo 
/050219_sontag_lesbian.html (noting obituaries did not acknowledge Sontag’s longtime relationship 
with photographer Annie Leibovitz). 
 159. In her posthumously released journals, Sontag wrote about being “queer” and about her “homo-
sexuality.”  On Self, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, § 6, at 36 (writing in 1959, “[b]eing queer makes me 
feel vulnerable”). 
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of the relationship between self-understanding and group affiliation in this 
age of identity-based politics.  There is a tipping point where a new iden-
tity category achieves sufficient political valence that the question of self-
identification becomes irrelevant and refusal to self-identify is read as un-
truthful denial.  In this way, an identity category that was initially self-
constitutive becomes a higher truth that others can declare on your behalf 
without your assent.160 
These observations regarding the historical contingency of identity did 
not come as a surprise to me.  I am well-versed in the myth of the transhis-
toric homosexual and have written about the evolution of the invert to the 
homosexual to the homophile to gay men and lesbians.161  I know that this 
evolution did not take place seriatim, in that new understandings of same-
sex desire did not neatly and completely displace the prior ones.162  
Through a complex process of asymmetric collaboration between the elites 
and the subject population, the competing theories vied for acceptance, 
achieved varying degrees of professional validity, and eventually infil-
trated conventional wisdom.163  They became part and parcel of how indi-
viduals saw themselves and the world around them.  None of this knowl-
edge was new to me, but it was decidedly dislocating to realize that the 
identity marked as contingent and waning was one that, despite my am-
bivalence discussed in section B below, I was still using.  It is one thing to 
watch historical contingent identity formations march across the pages of a 
book or the frames of a documentary; it is quite another to experience it in 
the here and now. 
The emergence of transgender communities and their compelling truth 
claims represent a new subjectivity that uniquely configures questions of 
gender, identity, and self-determination.  Transgender realities, therefore, 
challenge existing progressive gender and sexuality identity formations to 
jettison the gender taboo, admit to the weight of embodiment, and attempt 
to articulate an understanding of self and others that exist in the present.  
As discussed in earlier sections, the second wave of feminism and the first 
wave of gay liberation set about to construct identities that were self-
consciously oppositional in that they directly engaged and refuted the pre-
vailing and exceedingly damaging psychoanalytic model of gender and 
sexuality.  A central feature of this oppositional stance was an abstraction 
of gender and a denial of the physical.  Gender variant behavior was en-
  
 160. MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, QUEER IN AMERICA: SEX, THE MEDIA, AND THE CLOSETS OF 
POWER 84–93 (1994) (describing emergence of outing). 
 161. Knauer, supra note 73, at 10–32. 
 162. Id. at 27. 
 163. Id. at 10–11. 
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couraged in order to disprove gender roles and expectations, but the gender 
assigned at birth established a line that was not to be crossed. 
This extreme oppositional stance is no longer a pre-requisite to a posi-
tive identity.  I was frankly astonished when I reread Lesbian/Woman and 
Gay American History in preparation for this article.164  They were two of 
my favorite texts in high school, and I remember them being exceedingly 
foundational.  However, thirty years after the fact, I was offended by their 
blunt attempts to harness liberation ideology to clear huge swaths of terri-
tory with blanket claims of false consciousness.  I emerged with a new 
appreciation for the term “baggage.”  If these texts would fail to persuade 
me today, why should I let them continue to influence my world view?  
Freud is dead, and it is time to move on. 
After the shock wears off, being faced with impending obsolescence 
can prove invigorating.  The emergence of transgender issues represents a 
historical shift in identity as well as a potential generational struggle.  
However, in this case, any resulting generational divide would have to be 
driven by shear intransigence given that we have just established that the 
internalized taboo regarding the reality of gender was a historical device 
that is no longer needed.  Generational struggles are never pretty, but they 
can be devastating when they occur in an identity-based or political com-
munity.165  For example, the reports of the Lavender Menace debacle of the 
early 1970s still sting with a sense of betrayal.166  I have my own memories 
of the heated Sex Wars of the 1980s and even now shudder when I remem-
ber the scene at the Women and the Law Conference in 1985 when Cath-
erine MacKinnon’s speech was interrupted by pro-sex hecklers and all 
manner of nastiness ensued.167 
Flash points between gay and lesbian communities and transgender 
communities have also led to claims of betrayal and double dealing.168  
Perhaps the most disturbing skirmishes have occurred between feminists 
and transgender communities in connection with the definition “women-
only space.”169  The longstanding dispute centered on the admission poli-
  
 164. KATZ, supra note 24; MARTIN & LYON, supra note 71. 
 165. Rubin, supra note 15, at 475. 
 166. JAY, supra note 123; see also MARTIN & LYON, supra note 71, at 280–302. 
 167. LISA DUGAN & NAN HUNTER, SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE (1995) 
 168. For example, in a 2003 law review article transgender lawyer Phyllis Frye discussed protesting 
outside HRC fundraisers and characterized the HRC, along with Barney Frank and Ted Kennedy, as the 
major reason gender identity and expression were not included in ENDA.  Phyllis Randolph Frye, 
Transgenders Must Be Brave in Forging This New Front on Equality, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 767, 771 
(2003). 
 169. In one of the most publicized disputes over women-only space, a rape crisis center in British 
Columbia refused to permit a transwoman, Kimberly Nixon, to volunteer as a counselor.  Shannon 
Rupp, Transsexual Loses Fight with Women’s Shelter, THE TYEE, Feb. 7, 2007, http://thetyee.ca/News 
/2007/02/03/Nixon.  The transwoman was removed from a volunteer training session when it became 
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cies adopted by the Michigan Womyn’s Festival170 produced a series of 
regrettable quotes that mimic the tone and substance of Janice Raymond’s 
incendiary Transsexual Empire, where she asserts that “all [MTF] trans-
sexuals rape women’s bodies by reducing the real female form to an arti-
fact, appropriating the body for themselves.”171  Of course, transgender 
embodiments are not a metaphor for anything.  They are lived experiences 
which deserve our respect and support.  Historically, transgender narratives 
were silenced in the rush to create positive feminist and gay identities, but 
building your life on the backs of others is never a noble endeavor, and the 
result is always marred by negation. 
B. Can’t We Call Everything “Queer” and Call It a Day? 
A quick answer to this generational dilemma could be to dust off the 
catchphrase “queer” and label our attempt to articulate new and inclusive 
subjectivities as simply “queer.”172  In popular usage, queer has been in-
creasingly deployed as hip shorthand for LGBT issues and people—
particularly those that push the cultural envelope.173  Although the non-
category “queer” offers a potential vantage point to explore commonalities 
and differences with respect to gender and gender identification, queer 
theory may ultimately be ill-equipped to respond to certain transgender 
legal and political demands. 
The anti-identity coalition building of Queer Nation and the alternative 
positionalities envisioned by queer theory emerged from the turbulent 
HIV/AIDS activism associated with those dreadful years when the epi-
demic was unchecked and the government and the world seemed indiffer-
ent to the loss of gay lives.174  During this period, gay men and lesbians 
and allies began to collaborate in historically unprecedented ways in the 
face of a historically unprecedented sense of calamity.175  Coalitions 
  
known that her sex assigned at birth was male.  The rape crisis center stated that its policy of retaining 
only female-born counselors barred the transwoman from participation.  The court of appeals reversed 
an administrative decision that had found in favor of the transwoman, and the Supreme Court declined 
to hear Nixon’s appeal.  The litigation took ten years. 
 170. Nan Alamilla Boyd, Bodies in Motion: Lesbian and Transsexual Histories, in THE 
TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 428–29. 
 171. RAYMOND, supra note 5.  Unlike Raymond, the advocates of the “womyn born womyn” policy 
did not assert “that the problem of transsexualism would best be served by morally . . . outlawing its 
existence.”  Id. at 178.  However, they remained resolute that MTF transsexuals were not women, 
despite their claims otherwise.  If a MTF transsexual were to sleep with a lesbian without disclosing the 
fact that she had been assigned male at birth, it would be rape.  Nataf, supra note 15, at 443. 
 172. ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (1996). 
 173. Id. at 4. 
 174. DAVID M. HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 27–28 (1995); See 
also Stryker, supra note 29, at 7. 
 175. HALPERIN, supra note 174, at 62–63. 
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reached across barriers of class, race, and gender.176  Not surprisingly, 
given its genesis, the primary focus of queer theory was the construction 
and regulation of sexuality, albeit in the face of intersecting identities or 
positionalities.177 
Queer theory provides an inclusive framework which does not attempt 
to privilege or foreground one form of political or social identification to 
the exclusion of others.178  In this way, it offers a potential antidote to the 
silencing of transgender identities that occurred in the 1970s.  It denies the 
fixity of identity which it sees instead as historically contingent and provi-
sional.179  Although the original focus of queer theory was heteronormativ-
ity (i.e., denaturalizing the hetero-homo binary), its multivalent gaze has 
been just as productively turned to the gender binary.180  An example of 
this would be the anti-category of genderqueer which rejects the organiza-
tional imperative of the gender binary. 
However, the anti-identity stance of queer theory may have limited 
utility for some transgender individuals who strongly desire to embody a 
particular gender category.  In this way, queer theory may be able to ad-
vance transgender issues generally insofar as it denaturalizes the gender 
binary, but it does not provide the space for stable identities that may be at 
the root of some transgender legal demands.  For example, queer theory 
did not construct an alternative identity to gay and lesbian.181  Instead, it 
offered a position against the normal or the normative—a vantage point 
  
 176. See Douglas Crimp, Right On, Girlfriend!, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND 
SOCIAL THEORY 316–17 (Michael Warner ed., 1993) (noting “new political identifications began to be 
made”). 
 177. Although informed by feminist work on gender, queer theory recognizes sexuality or sexual 
orientation as distinct from, although related to, gender.  Queer theory rejects feminism (i.e., gender) as 
the privileged site of a theory of sexuality.  Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory 
of the Politics of Sexuality, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 1, 32 (Henry Abelove et al. 
eds., 1992) (theorizing a study of sexuality).  In turn, transgender studies challenge sexuality as the 
only prism through which to view gender diversity.  See Stryker, supra note 29, at 1. 
 178. Brett Beemyn & Mickey Eliason, Queer Theory in Practice, in QUEER STUDIES: A LESBIAN, 
GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER ANTHOLOGY 165 (Brett Beemyn & Mickey Eliason eds., 1996).  
Queer theory offers the potential within its perspective to acknowledge the differences and distinctions 
related to issues or identities, such as race, gender, class, ethnicity.  Id.  Beemyn and Eliason describe 
this as queer theory’s potential to be inclusive of race, gender, sexuality, and other areas of identity by 
calling attention to the distinctions between identities, communities, and cultures, rather than ignoring 
these differences or pretending that they don’t exist, as it often does now.  Id.  
 179. For a discussion of the influence of post-structuralism on queer theory see generally SHANE 
PHELAN, GETTING SPECIFIC: POSTMODERN LESBIAN POLITICS 152 (1994); Ki Namaste, The Politics of 
Inside/out: Queer Theory, Poststructuralism, and a Sociological Approach to Sexuality, in QUEER 
THEORY/SOCIOLOGY 194 (1996).  
 180. See, e.g., RICKI WILCHINS, QUEER THEORY, GENDER THEORY: AN INSTANT PRIMER (2004). 
 181. Halperin explains: “Queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, 
the dominant.  There is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers.  It is an identity without an 
essence.  Queer then demarcates not a positivity but a positionality vis-a-vis the normative . . . .”  
HALPERIN, supra note 174, at 62. 
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that was available regardless of libidinal object choice and that equipped 
one not to see any subject as simply gay or lesbian, but ideally as any sub-
ject who is outside or opposite the normal.182  Applied to transgender is-
sues and the gender binary, genderqueer would not construct an alternative 
identity to (trans)man or (trans)woman.  It would simply provide an op-
positional stance—a position from which to critique the binary from an 
outsider perspective.  Queer is the view from the margin. 
However, establishing a position from which one can critique the bi-
nary does not necessarily enable one to live within it.  As established ear-
lier, the post-feminist critique of gender largely ignores the real life impli-
cations of the binary, whereas genderqueer evinces a choice to live outside 
the binary.  Both overlook the pragmatic and urgent demand from some 
transgender individuals for a particular kind of gender legibility.183  Going 
forward, coalitional theory and alliance building must allow sufficient 
room for gender self-definition that includes a choice to move within the 
gender binary and not simply to choose to exit from it.  When pushed, 
queer theory will concede that stable gender identities can be transgressive 
where they are affirmatively chosen and crafted in defiance of assigned 
gender.184  However, this begrudging concession underscores the short-
coming of queer theory—not all transgender individuals have a desire to be 
transgressive.  To the contrary, some would argue that they are not en-
gaged in an act of self-definition as much as one of self-recognition.185  
Their actions are not repudiating their gender assigned at birth but rather 
confirming the gender that they have always been.186  For these individu-
als, queer theory may be of limited usefulness, as they would not satisfy its 
prerequisite for stable gender recognition because they do not report a de-
sire to subvert the prevailing paradigm. 
When queer theory examines the hetero-homo binary, its goal is to de-
stabilize the categories of heterosexual and homosexual and denaturalize 
heteronormativity.187  The system of sexuality itself is not contested—only 
  
 182. Id. 
 183. See Jay Prosser, Judith Butler: Queer Feminism, Transgender, and the Transubstantiation of 
Sex, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 264 (noting some transsexuals “seek 
very pointedly to be nonperformative, to be constative, quite simply, to be”). 
 184. Id. at 262–65. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See, e.g., Koluta, supra note 27.   
 187. See, e.g., INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 1 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991) (equating 
“philosophical opposition between heterosexual and homosexual with other conventional binaries”); 
Michael Warner, Introduction to FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET, supra note 176, at xxi (defining hetero-
normativity “as the elemental form of association, as the very model of intergender relations, as the 
indivisible basis of community, and as the means of reproduction without which society wouldn’t 
exist”). 
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its regulation and ordering.188  However, in the case of gender a queer cri-
tique can have a slightly different impact.  Assuming we recognize that 
individuals should have the ability to define themselves as either outside or 
within the binary, then the gender system itself is put into play—not sim-
ply its regulation and ordering.  The critique extends beyond the construc-
tion of stable gendered subjects and the question of whether there can be 
man without the oppositional (or complimentary) category of woman.  The 
disruption goes to the fact of gender, rather than to the content of the gen-
der system.  If an individual is no longer inextricably bound to the gender 
assigned at birth, what does it mean to say someone is a man or a woman?  
What does it mean to say that someone is neither?  Can someone be both?  
How do we account for the multidimensional nature of gender self-
definition? 
Gender is assigned at birth in response to specific visual or physical 
cues, and there is a considerable body of scholarship regarding the physical 
markers of gender that inform the assignment of gender.189  Commentators 
generally point to six different physical measures of gender that precede 
the gender assigned at birth or gender of rearing.190  These measures are: 
(1) genetic or chromosomal sex; (2) gonadal sex (reproductive sex 
glands)—testes or ovaries; (3) internal morphologic sex—seminal vesi-
cles/prostrate or vagina/uterus/fallopian tubes; (4) external morphologic 
sex (genitalia)—penis/scrotum or clitoris/labia; (5) hormonal sex—
androgens or estrogens; and (6) phenotypic sex (secondary sexual fea-
tures).191  Gender assigned at birth is typically considered the seventh 
measure of gender followed by the eighth and last measure—gender iden-
tity.192 
This breakdown of gender emphasizes the various physical attributes 
associated with gender.  It is often used to argue that gender classification 
is potentially very complex and, therefore, assignment at birth may be later 
contradicted by other physical characteristics.193  Although this observation 
reveals the assignment of gender at birth to be an imperfect science, it con-
tinues to privilege the scientific or objective assignment of gender.  Of the 
eight listed measures of gender, only one—internal gender identity—goes 
to the question of gender self-definition.  An individual’s gender identity is 
her/his strong internal sense of either being male or female.194  However, 
  
 188. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 177. 
 189. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 111, at 271.  
 190. Id. at 279. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 291. 
 194. MEYEROWITZ, supra note 29, at 99 (describing evolution of theory of gender identity). 
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individuals often desire to articulate internal gender identity through two 
important vectors of gender self-definition: gender expression and gender 
embodiment.195  Although it is possible that an individual who was as-
signed female at birth, but identifies as male, may continue to present as 
female and not seek bodily modification, transgender narratives report that, 
in many instances, pursuing gender expression and embodiment that is 
congruent with internal gender identity is essential to an individual’s sense 
of contentment and well-being.  Thus, when we speak of gender self-
definition, it must include room for gender expression and gender em-
bodiment consistent with gender identity. 
This form of gender articulation and self-definition can be particularly 
difficult and, indeed dangerous, when it contradicts gender assigned at 
birth.196  As explained in section C below, one way to address this is to 
provide legal recognition for the right to gender self-definition.  The law 
recognizes an individual’s gender assigned at birth and generally will only 
sanction gender reassignment where the individual has taken specific 
physical steps to alter her/his gender embodiment.197  The inability to se-
cure legal gender markers that conform to an individual’s internal gender 
identity can greatly increase her/his vulnerability to transphobic violence 
and discrimination, particularly when gender expression and/or embodi-
ment do not coincide with her/his gender assigned at birth (i.e., her/his 
legally recognized gender).198 
The multidimensional nature of gender self-definition directly impli-
cates our understanding of the categories of heterosexual and homosex-
ual—two instances where gender remains a defining factor.199  Indeed, 
much of the resistance to transgender issues in the gay and lesbian com-
munities has focused on controlling the definition of the identity classifica-
tions of gay and lesbian to the exclusion of transgender realities.  Just as 
heteronormativity naturalizes cross-gender (i.e., heterosexual) desire, the 
gay and lesbian communities assume homosexual desire as a threshold 
requirement for group membership.  In both cases, the hetero–homo dis-
tinction rests on a fundamentally one-dimensional understanding of gender 
that assumes gender is determined by assignment at birth.  Accordingly, 
the hetero–homo distinction becomes much more difficult to articulate if 
gender definition is seen as multi-dimensional.  For our purposes, it is in-
structive to consider four points of gender definition.  The first point is the 
  
 195. Nataf, supra note 15, at 445. 
 196. See San Francisco Human Rights Commission, infra note 221 (citing prevalence of violence). 
 197. See infra text accompanying notes 230–38 (discussing legal gender markers). 
 198. See, e.g., Bornsetin, supra note 8. 
 199. Stryker, supra note 29, at 7 (noting very concept used to distinguish “hetero” from “homo” 
sexuality loses coherence”). 
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gender definition made for us, namely the gender we are assigned at birth.  
The other three points all involve questions of gender self-definition: inter-
nal gender identity, gender expression, and gender embodiment. 
What does it mean to say that one experiences homosexual desire 
when we acknowledge these four different points of gender definition?  
What does it mean to say that one is a lesbian?  Is self-identification as a 
lesbian sufficient or is there a lesbian litmus test?200  Must all four points of 
gender be in congruence for both the subject and the object of the subject’s 
desire?  What about the transwoman who post-transition identifies as a 
lesbian?  To some feminists, the transwoman cannot be a lesbian because 
her gender assigned at birth was not female and, therefore, she was not a 
“womyn born womyn.”201  Where does this leave the transman who was 
“womyn-born,” but has transitioned and now identifies as male or perhaps 
has always identified as male?  Has he ceased to be a lesbian and, if so, 
when?  Is his desire for someone who is a congruent female on all four 
gender points considered heterosexual?  Would we say that the transman 
was a gay man if he were attracted to someone who is a congruent male on 
all four gender points?  What about someone who was only male on three 
gender points?  Two?  What about transmen who are primarily attracted to 
other transmen?  Shifting the focus for a moment, what happens to your 
sexual identity if your partner transitions?  What about someone who is a 
congruent female on all four gender points, but her husband who was as-
signed male at birth transitions to female?202  What about the congruent 
woman whose female assigned at birth partner transitions to male?  If the 
relationship continues, is it still a lesbian relationship?  What if the partner 
reports he always identified as male?  If so, was it ever a lesbian relation-
ship? 
Personally, I have always thought that the category of lesbian was 
rather confining.  Carved out from the umbrella term “gay” in order to un-
derscore the different needs and obstacles facing women, the “L” was 
eventually moved to the front of the “G” in order to remedy what was per-
ceived as the silencing of women’s voices and their contributions within 
the gay liberation movement.203  I chose to self-identify as a “lesbian” 
largely for the ease of political and social legibility, as opposed to an inter-
nal sense that it conveyed any essential truth about my nature.204  With the 
  
 200. Nataf, supra note 15, at 446 (discussing “woman-born-women”). 
 201. Devor & Matte, supra note 3, at 389. 
 202. See, e.g., HELEN BOYD, SHE’S NOT THE MAN I MARRIED (2007). 
 203. Some organizations still use the GLBT formation, such as the National Gay and Lesbian Task 
Force.  See, e.g., National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, http://www.thetaskforce.org (last visited Mar. 
2007).   
 204. See Fadi Hanna, Gay Self-Identification and the Right to Political Legibility, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
75, 126 (2006) (discussing “political legibility”). 
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exception of close friends, attempts to nuance the label always seemed 
pointless and, indeed, risked bombarding my audience with, what the kids 
refer to as, TMI (too much information). 
My self-inclusion in the group did not instill me with any great sense 
of belonging, and I was hard-pressed to identify a point of commonality 
that I necessarily shared with all other self-identified lesbians.  The best I 
could say was that we shared the same historical context where same-sex 
libidinal object choice carried great social meaning and, as a result, a spe-
cific set of expectations and/or disabilities could be imposed on me by vir-
tue of my self-inclusion in the category of lesbian.205  Despite my personal 
unease with the identity category “lesbian,” no one has ever questioned 
whether I had the bona fides to qualify for group membership.  There could 
be a debate over whether I was a “good” lesbian, but that determination 
relates to how I perform my lesbianism not to whether I was a lesbian.  
Today, a transwoman who self-identifies as a lesbian is often presented 
with a threshold challenge that goes directly to whether she can be a les-
bian. 
As a result of my abiding skepticism regarding stable lesbian and gay 
identities, I have always preferred to use the descriptive term “same-sex” 
in lieu of the L, G, and B.206  This means that I have written in the past 
about “same-sex relationships” and “same-sex desire.”207  I did this be-
cause I thought the construction was more accurate.  It included individuals 
who would not necessarily self-identify as L, G, or B.  It also shamelessly 
underscored the sexuality that was often obscured by adjectives like gay or 
lesbian.  I wanted to write about same-sex relationships and same-sex de-
sire, not those mythical creatures called gay men and lesbians.208 
In retrospect, my prior scholarship was exclusionary in that it left no 
room for specifically transgender experiences.  Beyond that, it now seems 
to have been built on an internal incoherency.  With the integration of 
transgender narratives and the acceptance of transgender truth claims re-
garding the lived experience of gender, what does same-sex mean?  Does 
same-sex desire only occur when all four gender points are in convergence 
for both object and subject?  Or does scholarship on same-sex desire pri-
marily concern the social meaning of same-sex desire, in which case the 
determining measure would be the external perception of the desire?  In 
other words, a transman who is in a relationship with a congruent four 
  
 205. BUTLER, supra note 23, at 140–41. 
 206. See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11 Relief Efforts and Surviving Same-Sex Partners, 
26 WOMEN’S RGTS. RPT. 79 (2005).  
 207. See, e.g., Knauer, supra note 73 (discussing regulation of “same-sex desire”). 
 208. Nancy J. Knauer, Lawrence v. Texas: When ‘Profound and Deep’ Convictions Collide with 
Liberty Interests, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 325, 326 (2005). 
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point man would be perceived as being in a homosexual relationship and, 
therefore, should be counted as such.  Perhaps same-sex desire is funda-
mentally unknowable because one of the points of gender definition is in-
ternal gender identity?  Or is gender simply a positive command of the 
sovereign in which case same-sex desire is defined ultimately by reference 
to the legal status of the participants?  In this case, the transman who had 
not changed his gender markers would still be legally female and, there-
fore, his relationship with a four point congruent man would be considered 
heterosexual. 
The recognition of different points of gender definition opens up con-
siderable space to explore a host of non-normative relationships and de-
sires that would not otherwise fall within the category of same-sex desire.  
It may also expose degrees of heterosexual desire in relationships that oth-
erwise would have been identified as same-sex relationships.  For example, 
assume a relationship between two individuals who were both assigned 
female at birth.  What does it mean if one of the partners is a four point 
congruent female but the other partner has a gender expression that is male 
or even an internal gender identity that is male?  Does this make the rela-
tionship a little bit heterosexual, say seventy-five percent homosexual and 
twenty-five percent heterosexual?  What if one of the partners identifies as 
genderqueer?  Can there be a homosexual relationship if one party does not 
identify as a gender? 
Indeed, if each one of us truthfully takes a gender inventory of 
her/himself and her/his partner (or desired love object), how many of us 
would score one hundred percent heterosexual or one hundred percent ho-
mosexual?209  How many of us would find all four points of gender defini-
tion in congruence for both partners?  In addition to (or as a result of) each 
of us being a little genderqueer, perhaps we are all just a little bit queer? 
C. Legal Reforms 
I have previously advocated the production of a “scholarship of articu-
lation” where both commonalities and differences are recognized and spo-
ken.210  The incorporation of transgender realities and experiences will no 
doubt further this goal as it will not only complicate, but also enrich future 
scholarship regarding gender and sexuality.  Although making our scholar-
ship more representative of the lived experience of gender is an important 
  
 209. For assistance constructing your personal gender inventory see, for example, KATE BORNSTEIN, 
MY GENDER WORKBOOK: HOW WE BECOME A REAL MAN, A REAL WOMAN, THE REAL YOU, OR 
SOMETHING ELSE ENTIRELY (1997). 
 210. Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 138 
(1998). 
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goal, as noted above in the Introduction, at the end of the day we produce 
theory to serve the living.  In the case of transgender individuals, this 
means that we must address the ever-present threat of violence and the 
legal barriers to gender self-definition and agency.211 
Part II.A notes that gender legal reforms have addressed the two main 
points of friction experienced by non-transgender individuals—gender role 
expectations/stereotypes and the regulation of same-sex relationships and 
associated sexuality.  In both instances, legal reforms have made signifi-
cant steps toward the formal elimination of gender-related bias.212  The 
prohibition against discrimination on account of sex has even been ex-
panded to include non-normative gender expression.213  In the case of 
same-sex relationships, marriage remains out of reach for federal purposes 
as well as in the vast majority of states, but many of the other legal dis-
abilities imposed on account of the gender of one’s partner have been re-
moved.214  There can be no doubt that such legal reforms have been ex-
ceedingly important and have greatly enhanced many lives. 
These reforms have largely ignored transgender identities with the ex-
ception of some courts and legislatures, which have extended anti-
discrimination protection and hate crimes sentence enhancement to include 
gender identity and gender expression.215  On a fundamental level, these 
reforms failed to address transgender concerns because they failed to ques-
tion the underlying primacy of the gender system and its reliance on the 
physical measures of gender.  Accordingly, in addition to promoting non-
discrimination norms, the next generation of legal reforms must grapple 
with ways to recognize gender self-definition and provide transgender in-
dividuals with an elemental level of security that is currently absent.  
Transgender individuals need access to identity documents that do not con-
tradict or place into question their articulated gender self-definition.  In 
today’s security-conscious society, many transgender individuals lack the 
  
 211. See infra note 221 (discussing prevalence of violence). 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43. 
 213. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).   
 214. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).   
 215. The First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have extended Title VII protections to include transgender 
individuals.  See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Rosa v. Park West Bank & 
Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).  Accord-
ing to the Human Rights Commission, nine states (and the District of Columbia) have anti-
discrimination laws that include gender identity or gender expression.  Human Rights Campaign – 
Your Community Homepage, http://www.hrc.org/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2007) (follow “Laws in Your 
State” under “Get Informed”).  Ten states (and the District of Columbia) have hate crime laws that 
include the gender identity or gender expression of the victim.  Id. 
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basic identity documents necessary for safe passage through certain public 
spaces and past certain state actors.216 
For non-transgender individuals, the extent to which gender continues 
to matter and the law continues to enforce and police the binary may be 
surprising.  Like most non-trans-identified individuals, I generally go 
through my days blissfully unaware of the number of times that my gender 
is read by acquaintances, strangers, and officials of the state.  For example, 
in Philadelphia the monthly pass for the local transportation system (aka 
“TransPass”) loudly declares the holder as either F or M with a large color-
coded sticker affixed at point of sale.217  I don’t worry that a police officer 
is going to accuse me of using a stolen TransPass because s/he concludes 
that my gender expression does not conform with my F sticker.  I do not 
think twice when I enter sex-segregated spaces, such as a public restroom.  
Nor am I cognizant of all the different legal documents that report my gen-
der as an essential part of my official legal identity: driver’s license, social 
security records, voter registration card, birth certificate, passport, or bank 
records.218   
To the contrary, a transgender individual can be subject to ridicule, 
harassment, and violence when her/his gender expression and/or embodi-
ment does not match her/his legal gender.  While attempting to traverse 
sex-segregated public spaces, s/he can be denied services, provided ser-
vices in a gender-inappropriate space, and reported to (and arrested by) the 
police for being in the “wrong” place.219  The ubiquitous public restroom is 
the most familiar form of sex-segregated public space.  No doubt, we have 
all experienced the anxiety produced by a frantic search for a public rest-
room when one is needed and none appears on the immediate horizon.  
This anxiety is markedly different if, in addition to finding a public rest-
room, you then have to assess the risk associated with your choice of which 
restroom to enter.220  Transgender individuals report considerable distress 
over restroom issues, and it is easy to see how denial of safe and reliable 
  
 216. See Viviane K. Namaste, Genderbashing: Sexuality, Gender, and the Regulation of Public 
Space, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 584–89 (discussing use of violence to 
enforce gender boundaries in public space). 
 217. Even when you order your TransPass online, you have to designate your gender.  See 
Shop.SEPTA.org, https://shop.septa.org/index.php?target=categories&category_id=9 (last visited Mar. 
5, 2007). 
 218. In addition, there are other important documents that I am not required to have that also require 
gender, such as Selective Service Registration and Immigration documents. 
 219. For example, Dean Spade was arrested for using a men’s room in Grand Central station.  Spade, 
supra note 14, at 17 n.5.  Spade spent twenty-three hours in jail on a trespassing charge.  Id. 
 220. See, e.g., Patricia Leigh Brown, A Quest for a Restroom that’s Neither Men’s Room Nor 
Women’s Room, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at A14.   
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access to public restrooms can effectively exclude some transgender indi-
viduals from full participation in public life.221 
In addition to public restrooms, many sex-segregated spaces are not 
immediately obvious because they typically serve the disadvantaged and 
the poor.  These spaces include homeless shelters, domestic violence shel-
ters, foster care facilities, and correctional facilities.222  In this way, the 
burden of the gender binary can be said to disproportionately fall on the 
most vulnerable segments of our society.223  Even for the privileged, con-
tradictory identity papers can produce difficulties in a wide range of unex-
pected venues.  For example, a confrontation with a transphobic state actor 
can run the gamut from a life saving/life threatening encounter with a po-
lice officer or emergency medical technician to bureaucratic torture ex-
acted by a clerk at the motor vehicle office.224 
Air travel is an excellent example of a normal everyday activity that 
can produce considerable stress and discomfort for transgender individuals.  
Although we may gripe and complain about long lines and the futility of 
putting our toothpaste in a clear Ziploc bag, the general public has largely 
accepted the enhanced security measures as part and parcel of post-
September Eleventh reality.225  However, for transgender individuals, these 
  
 221. In 2001, the San Francisco Human Right Commission conducted a large scale survey regarding 
transgender issues of bathroom safety where fifty percent of trans people reported that they had been 
harassed or assaulted in a bathroom.  See S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, GENDER NEUTRAL 
BATHROOM SURVEY (2001), available at http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf/sbac_survey.pdf.  
The most common form of harassment is questioning by police or security guards.  Id.  For trans people 
who are also poor or homeless and must rely on public bathrooms, the inability to use a public bath-
room without fear deprives them of a place to meet the most basic of human needs.   
 222. Trans people are disproportionately represented in the homeless population.  See THE NATIONAL 
GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, TRANSITIONING OUR SHELTERS (Dec. 15, 2003), available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_and_research/trans_homeless.  Most homeless shelters in the 
United States are segregated by sex.  Id.  This segregation has proven unsafe for transgender persons 
who are provided services based on their sex assigned at birth, rather than on their gender identity.  Id.  
In addition, transgender youth in foster care or juvenile detention face a number of disabilities, includ-
ing access to medical care, autonomy regarding dress and expression, and safety issues in sex-
segregated facilities.  See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Pumo v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) 
(holding N.Y. Human Rights Law required reasonable accommodation for minor in foster care). 
 223. Prisons raise questions of both physical safety and access to medical treatment.  The only U.S. 
Supreme Court case to discuss transsexuality involved an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and un-
usual treatment where prison officials placed a transwoman in the general male prison population, and 
she was savagely beaten.  See Farmer v. Brennen, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (describing transsexuality as 
“[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her ana-
tomical sex, and who typically seeks medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to 
bring about a permanent sex change”). 
 224. A 2002 survey conducted in San Francisco revealed a large percentage of respondents experi-
enced harassment at the hands of police officers.  See TRANSGENDER L. CTR., TRANS REALITIES: A 
LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF SAN FRANCISCO’S TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES, http://www 
.transgerderlawcenter.org/tranny/pdfs/Trans%20Realities%20Final%20Final.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 
2006). 
 225. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Terror Plot Foiled: Airports Quickly Clamp Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 
2006, at A1. 
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new security measures have made air travel a complicated and, at times, 
perilous proposition.226  Transgender advocates have prepared advice 
sheets for transgender individuals who are planning to fly and recommend 
that transgender individuals report to the airport well in advance of a flight 
in order to leave sufficient time for all the questions to be answered and 
addressed.227  A transgender individual whose gender expression and/or 
embodiment does not match her/his identity documents will be subject to 
increased scrutiny and questioning.228  Even transgender individuals whose 
identity documents are congruent may find the more intrusive physical 
screening threatening and invasive.229 
One solution to the problems created by contradictory identity docu-
ments would be to abandon gender markers as a form of identification or 
make them optional.  This seems unlikely in the short-term as the law has 
given no indication that it intends to move in the direction of gender blind-
ness.  The controversial Federal Real ID Act of 2005, which set forth uni-
form rules for state-issued driver’s licenses and other forms of identifica-
tion, specifically prescribes gender as part of the required identity data.230  
Moreover, the spate of same-sex marriage legislation that has swept the 
United States in recent years has served to increase the extent to which 
gender factors into the administration of our laws.231 
Short of abandoning gender, another solution would be to change the 
laws regarding legal gender markers to more accurately reflect the process 
of gender self-definition.  Currently, legal gender is assumed to be the gen-
der assigned at birth.  In order to overcome this very strong presumption, 
an individual who wishes to change legal gender markers generally must 
assert that the original assignment was in error or s/he has taken irreversi-
ble physical steps toward somatic gender reassignment.232  The federal 
government and the states have enacted different rules and regulations 
governing under what circumstances an individual can change which gen-
der markers.233  These rules are far from uniform and present a confusing 
  
 226. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., AIR TRAVEL TIPS FOR TRANSGENDER PEOPLE (Dec. 6, 
2004), http://www.nctequality.org/travel.asp.  
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2006) (enacted as part of the larger spending bill, Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 2005, H.R. 1268, 
109th Cong. (2005) (enacted)). 
 231. Nancy J. Knauer, The Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 23, 45–49 
(2005). 
 232. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 122–123 (Kan. 2002).  
 233. A request to amend or correct a birth certificate must be made to the state in which the person 
was born and often requires a court order.  LAMBDA LEGAL, AMENDING BIRTH CERTIFICATES TO 
REFLECT YOUR CORRECT SEX, http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-work/issues/rights-of-transgender-
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array of contradictions and silly distinctions.234  For example, in Kansas it 
is possible to change official gender markers after sex-reassignment sur-
gery, but such change is not effective for the purposes of marriage.235 
The stated rationales for this bright-line approach—that privileges 
physically verifiable manifestations of gender—are twofold: the need for 
certainty, and the desire to prevent the rampant fraud that could result if 
individuals were permitted to jump gender at will.236  This strict either/or 
approach to gender fails to address the lived experiences of many trans-
gender individuals who, for a variety of reasons, may not have access to or 
may not desire irreversible bodily modification.237  It rests on the notion 
that a change in legal gender markers is a reassignment of gender to cor-
rect an erroneous assignment at birth, rather than an act of self-definition.  
Legal gender markers are not changed to reflect internal gender identity 
unless an individual’s internal sense of gender is accompanied by an objec-
tive physical change in embodiment.238  Although gender embodiment can 
be an aspect of gender self-definition, it is not an essential one.  Moreover, 
in the United States, access to bodily modification is heavily regulated by 
the medical profession.  In this way, whether a transgender individual can 
change legal gender markers is fundamentally a question of diagnosis—not 
agency. 
A legal gender change regime that would recognize an individual’s 
right to gender self-definition would allow an individual to declare her/his 
legal gender.  Although it is easy to imagine traditional due process or 
equal protection arguments asserting such a right, or even a First Amend-
ment free speech argument,239 political will expressed through legislation 
would offer the greatest level of uniformity.  In terms of models, the 
United Kingdom has implemented the Gender Recognition Act which, to 
some extent, recognizes an individual’s right to declare her/his gender.240  
  
people/amending-birth-certificates.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2006).  The procedures used by the states 
are too diverse to summarize, but only three states specifically disallow the issuance of a corrected birth 
certificate:  Idaho, Ohio, and Tennessee.  Id.  Conversely, twenty-one states and the District of Colum-
bia expressly permit a change in the sex designation on a birth certificate following medical sex reas-
signment.  Id.  In many instances, it is not clear what quantum of medical intervention is required.  Id.   
 234. See Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can’t Take It with You: Constitutional Conse-
quences of Interstate Gender Identity Ruling, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819, 837 (2005) (outlining the ap-
proaches of different jurisdictions). 
 235. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 122–23. 
 236. See Brian Maffly, Male ‘Wife’ is Guilty of Fraud, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 6, 1995, at B1 (man 
plead guilty to defrauding “naïve” husband). 
 237. The National Center of Transgender Equality estimates that ninety percent of transgender people 
do not undergo genital surgery.  Andy Bromage, Born Identity, NEW HAVEN ADVOCATE.COM, Mar. 7, 
2007, http://www.newhavenadvocate.com. 
 238. Greenberg & Herald, supra note 234, at 837. 
 239. Id. at 863–84 (discussing equal protection and due process claims). 
 240. Id. at 823 (noting British response consistent with EU treatment of transgender rights). 
File: Knauer - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 1 Created on:  9/2/2007 4:16:00 PM Last Printed: 9/12/2007 10:06:00 AM 
50 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 1   
Although it continues to involve medical professionals, it does provide 
uniform guidelines pursuant to which an individual can choose to switch 
genders for all legal purposes.241  This would represent a considerable im-
provement over the current situation in the United States, which is a decid-
edly piecemeal affair with different rules and procedures existing on the 
state and federal levels, the vast majority of which emphasize gender reas-
signment surgery over other acts of gender self-definition.242 
V.  ACTION STEPS 
In lieu of a traditional conclusion, I think that it would be more pro-
ductive to suggest a series of action steps appropriate to try at home.  As I 
mentioned in the Introduction, although transgender issues raise fascinat-
ing questions of theory, it is imperative not to lose sight of the individuals 
involved who remain, to a large extent, outside the protection of the law.  
Here, I have in mind our students.  For the last several years, I have served 
on the Admissions Committee at my law school, and we have seen a con-
siderable increase in the number of applicants who are “out” as trans-
gender.243  Given the generational nature of this issue, we should expect to 
see more transgender students going forward.244  Many of these students 
are coming from undergraduate schools where transgender issues are at the 
forefront.245  Based on our experience, I suggest the five following steps to 
further trans inclusion:246 
1.  Educate yourself; 
  
 241. Robert E. Rains, Legal Recognition of Gender Change for Transsexual Persons in the United 
Kingdom, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 333 (2005). 
 242. Nat’l Ctr. for Transgender Equal – Federal Documents, http://nctequality.org/Issues/Federal_ 
Documents.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). 
 243. A 2003 survey of U.S. colleges and universities found a surprisingly high percentage of LGBT 
students reporting violence and harassment on account of their sexual orientation and/or gender iden-
tity.  Susan R. Rankin, Campus Climate for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Students: A 
National Perspective, Apr. 2003, available at http://thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/Campus Cli-
mate.pdf.  Twenty percent of the respondents reported that they had feared for their physical safety in 
the past year.  Id.  Fifty-one percent of the students surveyed said that they concealed their sexual 
orientation and/or gender identity to avoid intimidation.  Id.  Thirty-four percent reported that they 
avoided disclosing their sexual orientation and/or gender identity to a faculty member or administrator 
due to fear of harassment or discrimination.  Id. 
 244. Marilyn Elias, Gay Teens Coming Out Earlier to Peers and Family, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2007, 
at 1A (reporting on a study of LGBT teenagers). 
 245. The Transgender Law & Policy Institute reports that eighty-one colleges and universities have 
amended their non-discrimination policies to include gender identity.  TRANSGENDER LAW & POLICY 
INST., WAYS THAT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES MEET THE NEEDS OF TRANSGENDER STUDENTS, 
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/college/index.htm#practices (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). 
 246. The Transgender Law & Policy Institute has prepared a list of “best practices” for colleges and 
universities.   
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2.  Educate your colleagues, staff, and students; 
3.  Amend your institution’s anti-discrimination policies to include 
gender identity and gender expression;247 
4.  Adopt internal policies to further gender self-definition (e.g., 
name change rules, uni-sex bathrooms, removal of gender mark-
ers); and 
5.  Consider ways to include transgender issues throughout the cur-
riculum. 
Although most of these steps are self-explanatory, I would like to un-
derscore that the first step should be a program of self-education concern-
ing transgender issues.  By this, I mean that you should not rely on trans-
gender individuals whom you may encounter to provide you with a private 
tutorial.  In my experience, folks with majority identifications often do not 
understand how disrespectful this can be, not to mention how tedious it is 
for the person with the minority identification to have to explain 
her/himself over and over to each new and curious acquaintance.  Trans-
gender individuals, particularly our students, do not exist to educate us out 
of our ignorance and prejudice.  We should not assume that they will carry 
the laboring oar on our road to enlightenment. 
In the 1990s, my faculty grappled with ways to integrate lesbian and 
gay issues through the curriculum, and many of my colleagues explained 
that lesbian and gay issues were really inaccessible to them.  How could 
they possibly learn anything about that?  Apparently, they didn’t know the 
first place to start.  One of my well-meaning colleagues even went as far as 
to suggest that, if the LGBT student groups would prepare some compre-
hensive course modules, then s/he might consider teaching the material.  I 
remember being struck by just how foreign my colleague must have con-
sidered lesbian and gay issues if s/he was willing to abdicate a portion of 
her/his syllabus to a group of nameless students.  We all know that law 
  
 247. It is important to have a formal commitment to non-discrimination based on gender identity or 
gender expression.  In the last ten years, there has been a marked increase in the number of employers 
with anti-discrimination policies that include gender identity.  The HRC reports that a total of 307 
employers expressly prohibit discrimination based on gender identity.  Human Rights Campaign, 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Search_the_Database&Template=/CustomSource/WorkNet
/srch.cfm&searchtypeid=1&searchSubTypeID=1 (last visited Apr. 23, 2006) (search under “Employers 
with Non-Discrimination Policies that Include Gender Identity”).  This includes eighty-one Fortune 500 
companies and fifty-five colleges and universities.  GenderPAC, http://www.gpac.org/genius/index. 
html (last visited Apr. 23, 2006).  In 2006, the ABA House of Delegates passed a resolution urging 
“federal, state, local, and territorial governments to enact legislation on actual or perceived gender 
identity or gender expression, in employment, housing, and public accommodations.”  AM. BAR ASS’N, 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION 1 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership 
/2006/annual/dailyjournal/hundredtwentytwob.doc. 
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professors can suffer from some pronounced personality quirks, but we are 
rarely accused of accurately accessing the limits of our own expertise. 
Self-education with respect to transgender issues will necessarily be a 
continuing process.  It is important to realize that the transgender commu-
nities are engaged in an ongoing process of self-definition and, accord-
ingly, questions ranging from legal strategy to terminology will be subject 
to change and reassessment.248  However, it is safe to say that there are a 
few basic rules.  As a matter of civility, individuals should be called what 
they want to be called, and we should endeavor to respect an individual’s 
gender self-definition.249  For example, if a student in your class asks to be 
called by a name different from the one appearing on your class list, it is 
probably not appropriate to make a crack about it in open class, as did one 
of my colleagues at the beginning of this past semester.250  Although we 
might not think twice about a throw-away comment expressing benign 
surprise, it can pack considerable sting to the transgender student.  It can 
also signal to the other students a level of disrespect for the student’s gen-
der self-definition that was not intended.  As a matter of professionalism, 
lawyers who represent transgender individuals should educate themselves 
on the appropriate and preferred terminology and we should do the same in 
the classroom.251 
Self-education starts with the recognition that, for many, gender con-
tinues to carry great social meaning and consequences.  A good exercise is 
to spend a day trying to be conscious of every time your gender is read, 
requested, or acknowledged.252  The next time you walk into a public rest-
room consider how that experience would differ if you could be perceived 
to be in the “wrong” place and you could be questioned or detained or 
worse.  Consider what it is like to have no place that is “right.”  Once you 
become aware of the continuing weight of gender, transgender issues will 
become increasingly obvious. 
  
 248. Spade, supra note 14, at 15 n.2. 
 249. For example, journalists who cover trans issues have adopted guidelines for reporting on trans-
gender people.  The 2006 Associated Press Stylebook makes the following recommendation: “Use the 
pronoun preferred by the individuals who have acquired the physical characteristics of the opposite sex 
or present themselves in a way that does not correspond with their sex at birth.  If that preference is not 
expressed, use the pronoun consistent with the way the individuals live publicly.”  GLAAD Applauds 
Updated Associated Press Stylebook Entries, GLAAD, Mar. 13, 2006, http://www.glaad.org/ publica-
tions/archive_detail.phd?id=3869. 
 250. One way to avoid this is to institute a name change policy to ensure that a student’s chosen name 
is reflected in her/his records and email address.  At a minimum, you can circulate a seating chart and 
thereby poll the students directly. 
 251. Carolyn Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients’ Stories, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 329 
(2006). 
 252. RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
WHITENESS 142 (1993) (describing color-blind thinking as the “polite language of race”). 
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Resisting the conclusion that transgender issues are the “new” gay, I 
want to close with a final example from the struggle to include lesbian and 
gay issues in the curriculum.253  One colleague who taught in a subject area 
where lesbian and gay issues seemed a natural fit defended her/his decision 
not to cover any lesbian or gay issues on the grounds that s/he did not want 
to make any of the closeted gay students feel exposed.  What if homopho-
bic sentiments were voiced during class discussion, s/he asked?  Wouldn’t 
talking about the law’s inequities make the closeted students feel worse?  I 
recall being astounded by this explanation, but I was moved by what ap-
peared to be my colleague’s sincere agitation and apprehension.  S/he was 
deeply concerned that by speaking about these issues s/he would make a 
mistake, make someone uncomfortable, or otherwise give offense.  Un-
doubtedly, s/he would at some point do all of these things, as we will when 
we try to integrate transgender issues into our courses and support our 
transgender students.  Silence is not an alternative.  It is defeat—plain and 
simple.  As Audre Lorde told us decades ago, “it is not difference which 
immobilizes us, but silence.”254 
  
 253. Wilchins, supra note 126, at 62 (referring to “the new gay”). 
 254. AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAY AND SPEECHES 44 (1984).  Lorde maintained that 
“your silence will not protect you.”  Id. at 43.  You should consider yourself forewarned. 
